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Introduction 
In the mid-1950s Erich Fromm and Herbert Marcuse intellectually sparred with one 
another throughout several issues of the leftist journal, Dissent. The debate was so deeply 
personal that years later, when the two former colleagues found themselves riding on the same 
train, they rode in silence, and refused to acknowledge one another.1 Conventional wisdom 
surrounding the polemical Dissent debate and Fromm and Marcuse’s relationship in general 
perceives that the debate itself caused this rupture between them. Perhaps had the debate never 
occurred, the logic goes, the two could have had a relatively amicable relationship. To be sure, 
the debate, which took place from the summer of 1955 into the winter of 1956, has been rightly 
noted for its causticity and incivility. But the polemics of the debate itself can only go so far in 
understanding the depth of their intellectual differences and the resentment which Marcuse and 
Fromm harbored for each other.  
While it clearly took on personal overtones, Fromm and Marcuse’s dispute has almost 
solely been discussed as an intellectual disagreement of the relationship between Critical Theory 
and psychoanalysis, or scholars have minimized their differences altogether. However, I argue 
that the deterioration of their relationship, along with the particular ferocity of the debate itself, is 
indicative of a fundamental disparity in their diagnosis of modern society and the potential of 
liberation from its domination. This thesis was inspired, in part, by a desire to understand 
Marcuse and Fromm’s opposing notions of freedom, which are never referenced within the 
debate. My research shows that far from being inconsequential, their divergent historical 
analyses are woven throughout their ideas on many different subjects across several decades. 
Compared to Fromm, Marcuse offers a far more pessimistic indictment of society, often arguing 
                                               
1 Stuart Jeffries, Grand Hotel Abyss (New York: Verso Books, 2016), 294. 
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that if hope is to be found anywhere, it is only in the smallest chance that the prevailing social 
order can be entirely demolished. Though his pessimism, somewhat ironically, actually 
contributes to the fact that he becomes a more influential figure among the New Left in the 
1960s. Fromm, on the other hand, finds radical and subversive practices in the lives of everyday 
individuals, through acts of love and creativity, he argues, existence can be given meaning, and 
the anxieties of capitalism quelled. These differences are lent an even greater significance when 
properly contextualized historically, and especially within the lens of their competing dialectical 
interpretations of history, society, and freedom. In this thesis, I argue that their contrasting 
opinions on the possibility for political change are rooted in their dialectical methods and 
interpretations. 
Marcuse and Fromm were part of a much larger community of German Jewish 
intellectuals who went into exile after the collapse of the Weimar Republic. For them, World 
War Two and the atrocities of the Holocaust sparked a necessary reconsideration of the Western 
intellectual tradition. For example, Theodor Adorno, the leading thinker of the purportedly 
Marxist Frankfurt School remarked in 1944, “In the most general sense of progressive thought, 
the enlightenment has always aimed at liberating men from fear and establishing their 
sovereignty. Yet the fully enlightened earth radiates disaster triumphant.”2 In the minds of 
Adorno and many other Marxist thinkers, Marx’s theories had failed to save the Weimar 
Republic from fascism, as the failed German revolution of 1919 exhibited. The Bolshevik 
revolution in Russia, rather than delivering liberty, simply subjugated its people to a violent 
bureaucracy. And Western capitalist societies continued to exploit and alienate individuals. 
Adorno coined the term “Negative Dialectics” to help explain this seemingly hopeless situation. 
                                               
2 Theodor Adorno and Max Horkheimer, Dialectic of Enlightenment, trans. John Cumming (New York: Verso 
Books, 2002), 3. 
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In contrast to Marx’s optimistic belief in the inevitability of revolutionary change, Adorno 
offered a critique of capitalist society in which neither revolution nor political change were 
possible, let alone inevitable. The philosopher Karl Popper noted that “Marx's own 
condemnation of our society makes sense. For Marx's theory contains the promise of a better 
future. But the theory becomes vacuous and irresponsible if this promise is withdrawn, as it is by 
Adorno...”3 In the works of Adorno there was little potential for a better future. 
Fromm and Marcuse, who were once both members of the Frankfurt School came out of 
this same tradition of Critical Theory and German Jewish intellectualism. They are both also 
responding to the same historical developments. But, unlike Adorno, the works of Fromm and 
Marcuse do not entirely withdraw the promise of a better future. In fact, Fromm and Marcuse are 
often considered relatively optimistic, especially when compared to the Frankfurt School and 
other critical theorists. Moreover, Adorno’s prominence within the School has come to define its 
legacy in the minds of critics and supporters alike. His extraordinary pessimism left little room 
for political action, and consequently, so often the Frankfurt School is considered an 
amalgamation of aloof scholars with little concern for political participation or revolutionary 
action.4 But while both Fromm and Marcuse built from Adorno’s theoretical work and the 
dialectical tradition, and while they shared his history of exile, they crafted a distinctive critical 
theory that permitted for the possible realization of new political potentialities, even as they 
thoroughly disagreed as to the methods and conditions under which such realization could occur. 
Aside from comprehending the theoretical gap between Marcuse and Fromm, I will attempt to 
expand our understanding of the relationship between Critical Theory and emancipatory politics. 
 
                                               
3 Karl Popper, The Myth of the Framework (London: Routledge, 1994), 80 
4 Jeffries, 8 
Mantell 4 
Hegel’s Dialectical Method 
In order to understand the historical intellectual differences between Erich Fromm and 
Herbert Marcuse, one must understand dialectical analysis and the importance of dialectics to 
Critical Theory. Dialectics are often understood as originating in the works of the Ancient 
Greeks. Plato’s version of dialectics, for instance, was a verbal argument where one side presents 
a certain view, or thesis, and that view is then subsequently challenged by an opposing side, 
which presents an antithesis. In response, the initial side adopts a more sophisticated position: the 
dialectic is the process by which throughout the argument the views expressed become 
increasingly more sophisticated.5 
Hegel’s dialectic was also a contradictory process between two opposing sides, but unlike 
Plato’s dialectic which was focused on the process of argumentation, for Hegel the dialectic 
could be applied to “every logical concept.”6 Reason, for instance, necessarily generates 
contradictions, and therefore could be understood dialectically. Hegel argued that the dialectical 
process consisted of three different stages, or “moments.” The first moment is the moment of 
“fixity” in which any given concept has an apparent stable definition or determination (some call 
this thesis).7 The second he calls the “dialectical,” or “negatively rational” moment (antithesis). 
At this moment in the process, the initial determination “passes through its opposite” due to its 
own “restrictedness,” not entirely unlike Plato’s own application of the dialectic to a verbal 
dialogue. However, for this process of negation Hegel uses the word aufheben, which, according 
to him, means both to cancel and to preserve; thus, whatever concept is at hand both negates 
                                               
5 Julie E. Maybee, “Hegel’s Dialectics” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy ed. Edward Zalta (Winter 2016 
edition). https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2016/entries/hegel-dialectics  
6 Ibid 
7 Ibid, though it must be noted that the familiar interpretation of the Hegelian Dialectic (thesis - antithesis - 
synthesis) is a disputed interpretation. While many of Hegel’s dialectical interpretations fit this characterization, 
others do not. For the sake of simplicity, I will put these terms in parentheses in order to clarify and emphasize the 
basics of his dialectic, though I acknowledge that the use of these terms may oversimplify Hegel’s thought.  
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itself and preserves itself. The third moment he calls the “speculative” or “positively rational” 
moment (synthesis); it is the negation and unification of the contradiction itself. In other words, 
the speculative moment is the “positive result of the dissolution” of the prior two determinations. 
Hegel argues that this result “is conceived as it is in truth, namely, as a determinate negation; a 
new form has thereby immediately arisen.”8 Because it “cancels” out the prior contradiction 
Hegel argues it is a negation, but at the same time it takes on a new form, and thus takes on a 
positive character— it has a “content.” For Hegel, the determinate result is the “true result” 
because “it is a new concept but one higher and richer than the preceding—richer because it 
negates or opposes the preceding and therefore contains it, and it contains even more than that, 
for it is the unity of itself and its opposite.”9 Indeed, Hegel necessarily believed that the 
dialectical process must reach an inevitable, and “better” end: history is an unfolding of 
dialectical processes reaching toward “self-knowledge,” which he called the “Absolute Spirit.”10 
The “critical” nature of Hegel’s dialectic, which many scholars have remarked upon 
(including Marx, Marcuse and Adorno) comes from understanding concepts according to 
“negative” logic; in terms of what it is not. When a concept opposes, or negates another concept 
it contains that concept, as well as itself. Put simply, one may understand the color “blue” in 
relation to that which is not blue; the color blue is given meaning not only through its own 
“blueness” but also for the fact that it is not, for instance, orange. For Hegel, a concept is defined 
as much by what it is, as well as by what it is not, and especially by what it opposes.11 For this 
reason, Hegel’s philosophy was considered a “negative philosophy.”12  
                                               
8 Ibid 
9 Ibid 
10 Jeffries, 143 
11 Ibid 
12 Herbert Marcuse, Reason and Revolution; Hegel and The Rise of Social Theory. With a new pref. A note on 
dialectic, by the author (Boston: Beacon Press, 1960), vii 
Mantell 6 
 
Standing Hegel on His Head 
It is often argued that Marx’s re-interpretation of the Hegelian dialectic “stood Hegel on 
his head.”13 But Marx saw it differently, and argued that Hegel’s version of dialectics is already 
“standing on its head” and therefore it “must be turned right side up again, if you would discover 
the rational kernel within the mystical shell.”14 Indeed, Marx believed that the “mystifying” side 
of Hegel’s dialectic was the part which he got wrong, for in its mystified form the dialectic 
“seemed to transfigure and to glorify the existing state of things.”15 For Hegel, dialectical 
thought begins with just that- thought- whereas for Marx dialectics must originate not in the 
minds of individuals, but in the material world itself; hence why Marx’s dialectic has since 
become known as “dialectical materialism.” Marx’s interpretation of the dialectical method 
implies the “inevitability” of its process just as much as the Hegelian dialectic implies its 
determinate end, but Marx renders the process explicitly political. He substitutes class struggle 
for Hegel’s mystical notions of Spirit and Idea; he replaces the “synthesis” of Absolute Spirit 
with the liberation of humanity that can only occur with the realization of a communist society. 
Moreover, this dialectical progress functioned rather similarly as it did for Hegel; as the 
deficiencies within capitalism begin to show, it reaches a “crisis” and the conditions it creates 
can cause, in Marx’s view, a revolution or “negation.” However, crucially for Marx this rests not 
on a conceptual interpretation but a concrete one, even a sociological one. In other words, the 
contradictions within capitalism do not negate themselves because of theoretical flaws but 
material flaws; the tangible, observable conditions which result from its own contradictions 
                                               
13 Karl Marx, “Afterword to the Second German Edition,” in Marx’s Capital. London: Electric Book Company, 
2000. Accessed April 2019. ProQuest Ebook Central., 34 
14 Ibid, 34 
15 Ibid, 34 
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become intolerable for people and then revolution becomes the only logical possible outcome. 
While Marx emphasized the importance of “proletarian consciousness,” that is, in short, those 
who suffer under capitalism must become aware of their own oppression and their position 
within society, he argued that such consciousness can only arise out of experiencing conditions- 
it cannot come originate from abstract philosophical ideas alone. 
 
The Frankfurt School and Negative Dialectics 
The Frankfurt School was a school of thought that came out of the Institute for Social 
Research in Frankfurt, founded in 1923. At one point or another its formal members included 
Max Horkheimer (who served as director of the Institute from 1930 until 1953), Theodor 
Adorno, Otto Kirchheimer, Franz Neumann, Jurgen Habermas, and, of course, Herbert Marcuse 
and Erich Fromm, though Fromm was officially removed from the Institute in 1939 due to 
ideological differences. Since the School was almost entirely comprised of Jewish thinkers and 
self-declared Marxists, once the Nazis came to power the members went into exile, first to 
Geneva, before eventually taking up residence at Columbia University in 1934.  
Members of the school are most famous for creating and developing the philosophical 
approach known as “Critical Theory.” Max Horkheimer broadly defined a theory as critical 
insofar as it aims to “liberate human beings from the circumstances that enslave them.”16 In the 
words of Martin Jay, who authored a history of the School and its affiliates, “At the very heart of 
Critical Theory was an aversion to closed philosophical systems. To present it as such would 
therefore distort its essentially open-ended, probing, unfinished quality.”17 Nevertheless, critical 
                                               
16 Max Horkheimer, Critical Theory: Selected Essays (New York: Continuum, 1972), 244. 
17 Martin Jay, The Dialectical Imagination: a History of the Frankfurt School and the Institute of Social Research, 
1923-1950, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996), 41 
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theorists had many shared aspects to their thought, as Jay emphasizes; “Critical Theory, as it 
name implies, was expressed through a series of critiques of other thinkers and philosophical 
traditions. Its development was through dialogue, its genesis as dialectical as the method they 
purported to apply to social phenomena.”18 Often, critical theorists presented a Marxist 
background, many saw themselves as continuing, or responding to, the legacy of Hegel and 
Marx, and as a result, they often used a dialectical approach to forge many of their ideas.19  
Perhaps the most specific and important legacies that came out of the school was the 
intellectual reconsideration of both Marx and Enlightenment-era thought as a whole while 
maintaining a Marxist critique of capitalism.20 Critical theorists have become known for 
abandoning traditional Marxism, as they argued that the proletariat could no longer be counted 
on for revolution. In fact, many wondered if revolution could, or should, occur at all. Yet, they 
did not abandon the dialectical tradition set before them by Hegel and Marx. 
Theodor Adorno’s version of dialectics, negative dialectics, removed the teleological 
aspect of dialectics, without removing its determinative character. As he succinctly states in his 
1966 book Negative Dialectics, “Negative Dialectics is a phrase that flouts tradition. As early as 
Plato, dialectics meant to achieve something positive by means of negation… This book seeks to 
free dialectics from such affirmative traits without reducing its determinacy.”21 In other words, 
for Adorno history unfolded in contradictory ways, as it did for Hegel and Marx. However, this 
process of unfolding (or negation) was not progressing toward a “positive” end, or necessarily an 
end at all, as it did for these earlier thinkers. Instead, Adorno was suspicious of totality and 
                                               
18 Ibid, 41 
19 Rolf Wiggershaus, The Frankfurt School: Its History, Theories and Political Significance trans. Michael 
Robertson (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1994), 1-7 
20 Ibid, 5 
21 Theodor Adorno, Negative Dialectics, trans. E. B. Ashton (New York: Seabury Press, 1973), xix. 
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revolution, the two animating concepts in Marx’s and Hegel’s thought. He ultimately concluded 
that the “whole is the false”22 that indeed one is living, in the words of the Frankfurt School 
scholar Stuart Jeffries, in “a total system of delusion.”23 Negative dialectics serve as the basis of 
Critical Theory for many of its adherents. Its “purpose” (if it had one) was not to establish a 
philosophical doctrine, but to serve as a critique of other systems of philosophy and demonstrate 
their deficiencies. At best, it could only offer glimpses of insight outside of one’s otherwise 
delusional existence.24 
 
Herbert Marcuse  
Literature on the Frankfurt School often differentiates between the first-generation and 
second-generation Critical Theorists.25 Of the first-generation, Marcuse was one of the last to 
formally join the Institute for Social Research. Recruited as a political philosopher, by the time 
he joined in 1933 the Institute had already fled to Geneva in order to avoid the Nazi threat. He is 
also one of the few critical theorists who did not go back to living in Europe, along with Fromm. 
Marcuse ended up living most of his life in the United States. In part because of the publication 
of his most famous work, One-Dimensional Man, Marcuse became known as the “Father of the 
New Left.” Though Marcuse humbly insisted that “It would have been better to call me not the 
father, but the grandfather, of the New Left.”26 Yet, Marcuse’s affinity for the movement was 
certainly reciprocated, as the Professor Marshall Berman’s recollection of a concert at Brandeis 
University in the 1960s shows: 
                                               
22 Theodor Adorno, Minima Moralia, trans. E. F. N. Jephcott (New York: Verso Books, 1978), 50. 
23 Jeffries, 328 
24 Jeffries, 328-330 
25 Wiggershaus, 1 
26 Tom Bourne, “Herbert Marcuse: Grandfather of The New Left,” Change: The Magazine of Higher Learning 11:6 
(1979): 36-64, doi: 10.1080/00091383.1979.10569693 
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Word suddenly came up the line: ‘Marcuse’s here!’ At once there was a hush, and people divided 
themselves up to clear a path. A tall, erect, vividly forceful man passed down the aisle, smiling 
here and there to friends, radiant yet curiously aloof, rather like an aristocrat who was a popular 
hero as well… The students held their breaths and gazed at him in awe. After he had got to his 
seat, they relaxed again, flux and chaos returned.27 
 
The irony of treating Marcuse like an aristocrat aside, Marcuse had a profound impact in the 
minds of counter-cultural activists. Indeed, as I will discuss in further depth in Chapter Three, he 
was a mentor for Angela Davis, the Black political activist, academic, political theorist and 
member of the Communist Party. 
Davis wrote the preface for the third volume of Marcuse’s collected papers, The New Left 
and the 1960s, and offered insight into what may be one of his most important legacies. She 
wrote personally, “I have often publicly expressed my gratitude to Herbert Marcuse for teaching 
me that I did not have to choose between an academic and a political vocation that entailed 
making interventions around concrete social issues” even as Theodor Adorno characteristically 
told her that her desire to work directly in radical movements was “akin to a media studies 
scholar deciding to become a radio technician.”28 Marcuse’s sympathy for radical protest 
movements would later cause a rift in his relationship with Adorno, but it also indicated 
Marcuse’s unique role as a theorist rooted in the German intellectual tradition and a supporter of 
the American countercultural movement. He often articulated complex and seemingly 
pessimistic theories, while at the same time he found hope in the oppositional movements 
comprised of ordinary students and activists. Davis and others believed that Marcuse offered a 
specific type of optimism, one that, writing in 2005, made her nostalgic “because so few people 
seem to believe that anybody has any revolutionary potential left.”29 According to Davis, then, 
                                               
27 Jeffries, 310 
28 Angela Davis, preface to The New Left and the 1960s, ed. Douglas Kellner (New York: NY, Routledge, 2005), 
vii-xiv. 
29 Ibid, viii 
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Marcuse was not only a relatively optimistic thinker in respect to the Frankfurt School, but 
within the entire intellectual and political left of the late twentieth century. 
Marcuse’s legacy as a critical theorist is far from uniformly agreed upon however. He’s 
been accused of being a “pre-Marxist” an “anti-Marxist” or just not a Marxist at all.30 Berman, a 
Marxist thinker himself, was among an abundant number of thinkers who believed that 
Marcuse’s pessimism was beyond redemption, and that he postulated a theory in which “no real 
change was possible.”31 Yet, while Marcuse condemned society in its entirety, he also articulated 
optimistic, if utopian, alternatives to that society. His unique combination of pessimistic 
sociopolitical critique, on the one hand, with the fact that he maintained the potential for 
idealistic alternatives on the other, is a significant factor in his appeal to New Left activists.32 
Though Marcuse’s critics often dismiss him as a cynic, in doing so they ignore the hope 
contained within his theories. Similarly, I argue, alongside other writers including Stuart Jeffries, 
Douglas Kellner, and Rolf Wiggershaus, that he nonetheless remained a Marxist theorist.33 34 35 
Even though Marcuse is often understood in the context of the 1960s student movement, 
his contribution to dialectical thought is crucial to understanding both his intellectual legacy, and 
my argument. Adorno may have coined the term “negative dialectics” but as Stuart Jeffries 
demonstrates, “It was Marcuse who realised and theorised, even before Adorno, the power of 
negative thinking.”36 In Reason and Revolution (1941), his first book published in the United 
States, Marcuse wrote that negative thinking is the “driving power” of dialectical thought, used 
                                               
30 Douglas Kellner, Herbert Marcuse and The Crisis of Marxism (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984), 5 
31 Jeffries, 310 
32 Kellner, 288 
33 Jeffries, 9-10 
34 Wiggershaus, 104 
35 Kellner, 5 
36 Jeffries, 146 
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to determine the inadequacy of the prevailing reality.37 His version of dialecticism is similar to 
Adorno’s, and often offers a comparable pessimism, for he states “On theoretical as well as 
empirical grounds, the dialectical concept pronounces its own hopelessness.”38 Like Adorno, 
Marcuse believes that dialectical, and thus negative thinking, reveals “the radical falsity of the 
established forms of life,” and that humans are not free but instead exist “in conditions of 
alienation, exist as other than they are.”39 On the basis of dialectical logic, he condemns the 
prevailing social order as a totality; facts, empirical observations, science and technology only 
exist within “stages of a single process,” and are therefore subjective.40 For Marcuse, society and 
capitalism are “negative” because they are repressive. However, unlike Adorno, Marcuse 
believes that dialectical analysis can serve a “liberating function” — one is not destined to live 
an alienated life in perpetuity. The internal contradictions which dialectical analysis unveils, 
Marcuse hopes, can lead to “the explosion and catastrophe of the established state of affairs.”41 
Which is, in simple terms, the negation of the negative (society). But if his theory implies any 
action, it is only with his vague, yet remarkably famous concept of “The Great Refusal,” which 
he only describes as a refusal to “play the game” in which “the dice are loaded.”42 The Great 
Refusal, despite its vagueness, is a wholly dialectical concept- it is a great negation.43  
 
                                               
37 Herbert Marcuse, Reason and Revolution, viii-ix  
*the new preface to this book, which this quote is pulled from, was written in 1960, however since Marcuse is 
merely reflecting on what he wrote in 1941 it is still most useful to understand in the context under which he first 
developed and explicated on his dialectical theory. In fact, if a more in-depth explanation of Marcuse’s dialectical 
method is desired, this preface “A Note on Dialectic” serves as a useful introduction to Marcuse’s comprehension of 
dialecticism.  
38 Herbert Marcuse, One-Dimensional Man: Studies in the Ideology of Advanced Industrial Society (Boston, MA: 
Beacon Press, 1964), 253. 
39 Marcuse, Reason and Revolution, xiii 
40 Ibid, viii 
41 Ibid, ix 
42 Ibid, x  
43 Jeffries, 319, as Jeffries points out, many scholars have noted the vagueness of “The Great Refusal.” 
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Erich Fromm 
Fromm was also a “first-generation” member of the Frankfurt School. Recruited as a 
psychoanalyst, Fromm formally joined in 1930, a few years before Marcuse, and therefore was 
able to live and work in Frankfurt before being forced into exile. Once in the United States, 
Fromm set himself apart from his reclusive colleagues by engaging with other faculty at 
Columbia University and forming relationships with New York psychoanalysts.44 While many of 
his colleagues, including Adorno, did not particularly like life in the United States and isolated 
themselves, Fromm was comfortable in America, he learned to write English quicker and with 
greater ease, and he readily integrated into American society.45 He even somewhat embraced 
American popular culture, though he remained decidedly critical of American society. In part 
because of this, along with financial problems at the Institute and intellectual differences, Fromm 
was removed from the Institute in 1939. Soon after, he became involved with a group of Neo-
Freudians, including Harry Stack Sullivan and Karen Horney, both of whom Marcuse will later 
explicitly criticize in the Dissent debate.46 Eventually, in 1950, he moved to Mexico, though he 
continued to spend most of his time working and teaching in the United States.47 
Fromm’s legacy is far more obscure than Marcuse’s, especially in regard to his 
association with the Frankfurt School. Despite the fact that Fromm is a lesser known figure 
within the School, prior to his dismissal he played a more significant role, in intellectual terms as 
well as material terms, than both Adorno and Marcuse.48 Crucially, he helped relocate and re-
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establish the Institute at Columbia University.49 Initially, Fromm was recruited for his 
psychoanalytic work which offered an intellectual marriage between Marx and Freud. Though 
the ideological rift between Fromm and the rest of the School has been duly noted, many 
scholars have emphasized the similarities between Fromm’s thought and the other critical 
theorists, as well as the more likely financial component which contributed to his termination.50 
His affiliation with the Frankfurt School, even after his departure, is hardly debatable, and 
Fromm is still considered a critical theorist by nearly all scholars within the field.51 
Like Marcuse, Fromm is also known for his influence as a “public intellectual” in the 
1960s, and he appealed to many student activists, though he did not do so to the same extent as 
Marcuse.52 Unlike other critical theorists, Fromm was active in electoral politics, and forged 
relationships with many different politicians. He was also an active member of the Democratic 
Socialist party in the United States, he helped found and fund Amnesty International, and he 
frequently spoke before the Foreign Relations Committee in the U.S. Senate. According to his 
biographer, Lawrence Friedman, President Kennedy even read his most respected book, Escape 
From Freedom. At the same time, Fromm “lived his life as a radical intellectual, creating and 
promoting powerful critiques of market culture, consumerism and mass dynamics of 
authoritarianism and narcissism.”53 In a way, Fromm attempted to balance serious intellectual 
work, rooted in a Marxist critique of capitalism, while remaining politically active within the 
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confines of governmental institutions. His reputation as an optimist, in that way, is more than 
appropriate. 
Dialectics informed much of Fromm’s intellectual work, as it did for Marcuse and many 
other critical theorists. Yet, Fromm’s relationship to the dialectical method is far less explicit, 
and he does not postulate a “negative dialectic.”54 As the German psychoanalyst, and Fromm’s 
estate manager, Rainer Funk, details, Fromm rarely mentioned dialectics explicitly in his work, 
and, unlike Marcuse, never wrote on his specific interpretation of dialectical thought.55 
Nevertheless, Fromm remains a dialectician.56 In one of the few works where Fromm does 
mention dialecticism, Escape From Freedom (which is also widely considered his most 
intellectually significant work) he provides important insight into his dialectical interpretation, 
which he explicates through his concept of “negative” and “positive” freedom, “freedom from” 
and “freedom to,” respectively. Freedom, according to Fromm, develops in contradictory ways. 
It is simultaneously a process of “growing strength and integration, mastery of nature, growing 
power of human reason, and growing solidarity with other human beings” as well as a process of 
“growing isolation, insecurity” and “feelings of one’s own powerlessness and insignificance as 
an individual.”57 Like Marx, Fromm believed that these contradictions were intolerable and thus, 
ideally, the “economic, social and political conditions” will develop in such a way that realizes 
“positive freedom”; the freedom to live in “active solidarity with all men and his spontaneous 
activity, love and work, which unite him again with the world… as a free and independent 
individual.”58 Unlike Marx, however, Fromm argued that the resolution of these contradictions 
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will not necessarily materialize with the development of communist society (though it ideally 
would).59 In fact, the intolerability of these contradictions may lead to an “escape.” Fascism, for 
Fromm, is one way in which individuals sought to escape the burden of the dialectical nature of 
freedom. Moreover, Fromm’s notion of positive freedom conflicts with Marcuse’s, who argued 
that freedom is “the continuous negation of that which threatens to deny (aufheben) freedom. 
Thus, freedom is essentially negative.”60 In another sense, freedom is only “freedom from toil” 
and “freedom from repression” according to Marcuse.61 This different interpretation of freedom 
informs much of their contrasting dialectical interpretations of history as a whole. 
 
The Dissent Debate 
Initially the debate was received by the readers of Dissent as a dramatic occurrence, and 
in many ways, it was.62 The debate was defined by scathing personal condemnations, and harsh 
accusations of conservatism, nihilism, and conformism. As much as it was a dense intellectual 
disagreement between two theorists, it was also teeming with reciprocated personal attacks 
between two former colleagues. To be sure, even if one sees the debate as overstated (which 
many recent scholars do) both Marcuse and Fromm saw their academic careers and even social 
lives drastically change as a result; the former was thrusted into relative fame and popularity, in 
part because of the debate and in part due to his extremely well-received publication of One-
Dimensional Man, while the latter slipped into academic obscurity. Fromm’s reputation simply 
could not withstand Marcuse’s accusations of revisionism and conservatism, and, in the words of 
the Fromm scholar Neil McLaughlin, became a “forgotten intellectual.” McLaughlin asserted 
                                               
59 Ibid, 54 
60 Marcuse, Reason and Revolution, ix 
61 Marcuse, One-Dimensional Man, 223  
62 McLaughlin, “The Fromm-Marcuse Debate,” 485 
Mantell 17 
that “When the social protest movements of the 1960s created a large market for critical theory 
among radical students and intellectuals, this critique of Fromm was popularized by Herbert 
Marcuse and then accepted by a generation of New Left scholars.”63 Even as Fromm went on to 
sell millions of copies of his books a clear consensus had emerged proclaiming Marcuse the 
victor. A slew of leftist scholarship for decades to come recapitulated and amplified Marcuse’s 
position against Fromm, and Fromm’s relationship with many New York intellectuals were even 
severed as result.64 Thus, Fromm himself recognized he had “lost” at least in the court of 
academic opinion.65 
In 1986, however, the philosophy professor John Rickert wrote “The Fromm-Marcuse 
Debate Revisited,” a brilliant work that defended Fromm against Marcuse’s attacks, and argued 
that Fromm’s theories were not conformist. By methodically dissecting their arguments, Rickert 
argued that Fromm’s position was far sounder and more logical, and it indicated a more nuanced 
and accurate interpretation of Freud. During the next few decades that followed, in part because 
of Rickert’s work, Marcuse’s claims against Fromm have been almost entirely dismissed, while 
Fromm’s condemnation of Marcuse as an irredeemable pessimist has been met with a similar 
level of skepticism.66 In the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Arnold Farr writes that “The 
Fromm/Marcuse debate represents an unfortunate moment in the history of critical theory where 
two major thinkers spoke right past each other.”67 Fromm’s biographer similarly argued in 2013 
that Marcuse’s arguments did not “nullify” Fromm’s position.68 Neil McLaughlin, in his 2017 
essay, took Rickert’s argument a step further, and argued that the differences between Fromm 
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and Marcuse are insignificant. He asserted that “the consensus within so much of contemporary 
psychoanalysis has moved so far away from libido theory, the death instinct and theories of 
primal hordes” that the terms which Marcuse and Fromm debated are no longer relevant.69 He 
eventually concluded: 
Critical theorists today reading Fromm and Marcuse would do well to emphasize their 
commonalities not their polarized and personal conflict. Moving beyond the Fromm–Marcuse 
debate will help focus our energies on synthesizing a new critical theory by engaging the 
greatness and the limitations of both thinkers.70 
     
Despite the fact that the psychoanalytic dispute between Marcuse and Fromm has been 
scrutinized by a number of scholars, if not entirely nullified, the debate is still heavily featured in 
biographies on Marcuse, Fromm and the whole Frankfurt School. In Fromm’s biography, The 
Lives of Erich Fromm, for instance, it is frequently mentioned throughout the book, often in 
terms of the lasting damage it did to Fromm’s quest for academic respectability and his personal 
relationship with Marcuse.71 In Stuart Jeffries’ Grand Hotel Abyss, he similarly noted the harm it 
caused to Marcuse and Fromm’s relationship, but he also remarked that the debate was odd given 
the apparent intellectual similarities between the two.72 In Rolf Wiggershaus’ The Frankfurt 
School, he emphasized the long-term impact it had on the entire School; by Adorno’s death in 
1969, he argued, the School had become so fractured due to disputes such as the one between 
Fromm and Marcuse that it had effectively disintegrated.73 Yet, in works on Marcuse alone the 
conflict between them is referenced less often, perhaps because it had far less impact on 
Marcuse’s life and work.74 For example, in Douglas Kellner’s Herbert Marcuse and The Crisis 
of Marxism their conflict is only alluded to once, and only to provide context for the epilogue of 
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Eros and Civilization, which had first ignited the dispute (the debate itself is not mentioned at 
all).75 In fact, Fromm is discussed several times throughout the text, but almost always to note 
that they often wrote about the same topics and exhibited certain intellectual similarities.76  
The work of Rickert and McLaughlin is particularly important for recognizing both the 
overstated legacy of the debate, and the fact that Fromm and Marcuse’s psychoanalytic 
disagreement is largely unfounded. Moreover, I agree with McLaughlin that the specific terms 
which they debate are almost entirely irrelevant to the field of psychoanalysis, as well as to 
Critical Theory. The Fromm-Marcuse debate is not helpful for understanding the intellectual 
differences between the two men. Yet, the debate’s aggressive causticity indicates that there 
were important opposing theories between them, even if their opposition was misplaced within 
the debate itself. By contextualizing the way in which we understand these two thinkers outside 
of the debate and psychoanalysis, and within their conception of dialecticism, their differences 
become in fact, that much more pronounced.  
 In order to make my argument I have structured my thesis into three chapters. In the first 
chapter I acknowledge the mostly shared critique of capitalist society offered by Marcuse and 
Fromm, and then I present a detailed analysis of their dialectical methods, highlighting the 
different ways they interpret the development of capitalist society and its repression. In the 
second chapter I look at the implications of their competing dialectical methods, which reveals 
the incompatibility of their theoretical solutions as well as their notions of political emancipation. 
In the third and final chapter I examine the ways in which Fromm and Marcuse both engaged 
with the political world around them. I argue that this engagement is not only indicative of their 
role as outliers within the Frankfurt School, but also serves as the manifestation and 
                                               
75 Kellner, 191 
76 Kellner, 111-112, 126, 162-163, 267  
Mantell 20 
representation of their dialectical thought. For both men dialecticism informed not only their 
contrasting theories for action and their critique of capitalist society, but their concrete political 
endeavors. 
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Chapter 1: Origins of Disagreement and The Dialectic of Reason 
In 1941, Erich Fromm and Herbert Marcuse each published their first books in English. 
At the time, they were part of a large disparate community of German Jewish emigres living in 
exile, many in the United States, and many of whom were engaged in a heated a debate about 
how the atrocities of totalitarianism could have occurred. At the point Escape From Freedom 
and Reason and Revolution were published the Third Reich had nearly entire control over the 
European continent- only Great Britain and an ever-shrinking portion of the Soviet Union 
remained as the last opponents to the Nazi juggernaut. Understanding this context is important 
for understanding the implications of their writing; Marcuse and Fromm were writing both to 
interpret and critique capitalist society and on the origins of European fascism, two phenomena 
which they saw as indelibly related. Their dialectical notions of history led them both to offer an 
indictment of modernity and capitalist society, which destroyed human relationships, isolated 
and alienated individuals, and objectified human beings. Modernity and capitalism were, at least 
in part, to blame for fascism. However, their dialectics also differed from each other, which led 
them to a disparate historical interpretation of fascism and analysis of the modern concept of 
“Reason.” For Marcuse, reason led to the increasing rationalization and mechanization of 
society, in turn, it helped pave the way for totalitarian, technocratic control. Fromm argued 
contrastingly, that although capitalism and enlightenment thought created the conditions which 
gave fascism its appeal, fascism was a reaction to Enlightenment ideals such as reason, free 
thought, and individuality.  
Following the end of World War Two, Theodor Adorno famously wrote, “there can be no 
poetry after Auschwitz.”77 Especially for German Jewish intellectuals, World War Two marked a 
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decisive shift in the ways in which they assessed concepts of modernity and Enlightenment era 
values. While many were reluctant to entirely abandon Enlightenment traditions, the barbarism 
of the Third Reich, which came out of the relatively liberal Weimar Republic, demanded an 
explanation. Perhaps, they wondered, fascism was not an aberration from the Enlightenment 
tradition, but it’s almost inevitable apotheosis. In Dialectic of Enlightenment, published in 1944, 
Adorno questioned what may be the highest Enlightenment ideal; that of reason. Reason, for all 
of its purported objectiveness and logic, was also cold and calculating; Adorno argued that the 
functionalization of reason became a “purposiveness without purpose” which then “could be 
harnessed to any end.”78 Harbored within this concept of reason is the consideration of “human 
actions and desires exactly as if I were dealing with lines, planes, and bodies.”79 Consequently, 
the totalitarian order was able to put this into effect “in utter seriousness… Its canon is its own 
brutal efficiency.”80 In the enlightenment process, subjective morals and values came to be seen 
as sentimental, even superstitious, in favor of efficiency, logical calculations, and over-
rationalization. Fascism, along with modernism and capitalism, was the product of reason, and 
therefore reason alone could not help explicate the horrors of Nazism, nor the hardships endured 
under capitalism. 
Erich Fromm and Herbert Marcuse also theorized on the role of reason and 
Enlightenment values within modern society. In many ways they found common ground through 
the ways in which they criticized modernity, and capitalist society and its resilience, even as their 
exact language and dialectical methods differed. At the core of both their critiques, like many 
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Marxists before them, is the concept that humankind is alienated under capitalism. Douglas 
Kellner, a Marcuse scholar, states that “the thrust of Marcuse’s analysis is that people are 
increasingly alienated from their fundamental potentiality for creative individuality.”81 Indeed, 
this idea is almost exactly the same as Fromm’s argument in Escape From Freedom, where he 
insists that civilization still does not allow for “the full realization of the freedom of 
personality.”82  
An essential problem of modern capitalism and modern thought, for both men, was that 
even though it espoused notions of individuality, this individuality was both flawed and illusory. 
Fromm saw the isolation, aloneness, and fear that was derived from capitalistic individuality, and 
Marcuse believed that positivistic notions of an individual able to “rise above” the repressive 
conditions before them was naive at best, and conformist at worst, akin to the “bootstrap 
mentality” that pervades throughout capitalist society. Moreover, they both believed that there 
existed a pervasive element of conformity, particularly within American capitalism, which 
precipitated a lack of authentic individuality. Fromm called this “automaton conformity”; it led 
individuals to “fall in step like a marching soldier or a worker on the endless belt.”83 One felt 
“compelled to conform to seek his identity by continuous approval and recognition of others.”84 
Marcuse similarly argued that the individual is reduced under capitalism; concepts of choice are 
in fact preconditioned and restricted by capitalist society; one can merely choose between “Ford 
or General Motors, Wheaties or Cheerios.”85 The few choices one does have is so often between 
material items that are nearly indistinguishable from each other.  
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This illusion of individuality brings with it grave consequences for Fromm and Marcuse. 
Fromm warned that “... although there are true individuals among us, this belief is an illusion in 
most cases and a dangerous one for that matter, as it blocks the removal of those conditions that 
are responsible for this state of affairs.”86 Marcuse similarly argued that individualistic notions of 
the “productive realization of the personality, of care, responsibility, and respect for one's fellow 
men, of productive love and happiness” is impossible within capitalist society, a society “of total 
alienation, dominated by the commodity relations of the ‘market.’”87 To Marcuse, pretending 
otherwise is not only fallacious, but can in fact be repressive, for the encouragement of those 
values is its own form of repression in capitalist society.88 
The touchstone of their shared critique of modernity rests on what they deem as the 
“unfreedom” of capitalist society, even though they disagreed on the nature of freedom. Along 
with the illusion of choice, both Fromm and Marcuse bore witness to the oppressive nature of 
facts, common sense, and science, which restricts freedom of thought and action. Fromm argued 
that throughout history Western society has increasingly won freedoms from traditional “external 
restraints.”89 This led to the establishment of such concepts as the freedom of religion and 
freedom of speech, which are according to Fromm, “negative” freedoms. However, while these 
freedoms are notable gains, Fromm observed that “new enemies of a different nature have 
arisen.”90 For example, though society has established freedom of religion, “the modern 
individual has lost to a great extent the inner capacity to have faith in anything which is not 
provable by the method of the natural sciences.”91 Similarly, he recognized the repressive 
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“anonymous authorities” of common sense and public opinion, which prevents individuals from 
thinking originally, or differently from what “everybody else thinks and says.”92 For Fromm, an 
essential problem modernity posed was the lack of these “positive freedoms,” freedoms that 
would otherwise enable us to “realize our own individual self.” While some people, he argued, 
advocate for increasing and granting more negative freedoms, such freedoms merely remove 
external restraints on the individual, they do not allow for individuals to act freely in terms of 
their own ability to think and act spontaneously and originally. 93 
Although Marcuse did not agree with Fromm’s emphasis on the necessity for positive 
freedom, he did recognize the repressive nature of “facts.” Throughout much of his writings 
Marcuse expressed opposition to facts, science, and empiricism, which he labels “positivistic.” In 
fact, he described his version of negative dialectics as in direct opposition to those positive facets 
of modernity, saying “the power of negative thinking is the driving power of dialectical thought, 
used as a tool for analyzing the world of facts in terms of its internal inadequacy.”94 In this 
world, common sense and science are elevated above criticism, and echoing Fromm’s theory, 
Marcuse argued acts as repressive tools of modern capitalist society. The result of this, for both 
men, is that modern society, and the rationalism that pervades throughout prevents actual 
freedom of thought and inquiry; one can critique the “prevailing social order” only on “factual” 
terms, that is, especially for Marcuse, on its own terms. 
As a result of this lack of authentic freedom, in Marcuse’s words, humanity is living in a 
“state of privation that forces the subject to seek remedy.”95 For both Fromm and Marcuse, these 
remedies were often obtained in insufficient and capitalistic ways, often by embracing the total 
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commodification of not only “things” but of human relationships, and even one’s own self. By 
seeking certain remedies, the harmful effects become only further exacerbated. Marcuse 
believed, for instance, that we not only fetishize commodities but we actually commodify 
ourselves; “the people recognize themselves in their commodities; they find their soul in their 
automobile, hi-fi set, split-level home, kitchen equipment.”96 Modern capitalism, to Marcuse, 
does not permit individuals to realize the full potential of their personality, instead it only offers 
a sense of identity and false individualism through commodification, which helps to assuage 
discontent. Though we may not be free, the argument goes, at least we have nice things.  
Fromm was equally concerned with the “remedies” which individuals sought to mitigate 
the ills of capitalism— Escape From Freedom was almost solely concerned with describing this 
phenomenon. For Fromm, the problems of negative freedom are dialectical; it simultaneously 
reduces individual agency but it also further isolates and alienates individuals. One is 
simultaneously alone in the world, but still utterly powerless, subjected to forces beyond their 
control. Consequently, humans attempt to “escape” from this freedom. In 1941, Fromm 
explicitly argued that fascism offered one such escape. But free market capitalism also offers its 
own form of escape, again through total commodification. For example, one may adapt to the 
market economy “by becoming detached from authentic emotions, truth, and conviction.” 
Fromm contended, similarly to Marcuse, that for this person “everything is transformed into a 
commodity, not only things but the person himself, his physical energy, his skills, his 
knowledge, his opinions, his feelings, even his smiles.”97 Both Fromm and Marcuse maintained 
that capitalism is hostile to traits such as love, creativity, and authentic individuality. But 
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capitalism offers solutions, however insufficient, to its own repressiveness, in this case by 
commodifying human relationships. 
 
Toward a Critique of Fascism and Reason 
In the 1950s and 1960s Erich Fromm and Herbert Marcuse would come to contemplate 
and diagnose the problems faced by democratic societies in the postwar era. Yet, in the 1940s, 
they were emphasizing what they saw as an especially grave consequence of modernity and 
capitalism; the rise of fascism. Like Adorno and other critical theorists, they understood 
fascism’s rise in dialectical terms, history was not a random sequence of events but a constant 
development of its own contradictions. Crucially, however, Fromm and Marcuse interpreted this 
dialectical process in vastly different ways. For Marcuse, fascism was not a complete betrayal of 
liberal, modern Western ideas and institutions, including capitalism and bourgeois democracy, 
but was in fact a “determinate” result of its own legacy; a product of “Reason.” For Fromm, 
fascism was a reaction to the dialectical tension that resulted from the “positive” and “negative” 
character of freedom. Reason, for Fromm, was a positive outcome of the freedoms established by 
the enlightenment. Fascism, on the other hand, was a rejection of reason. 
In the preface, Fromm explained the thesis to Escape From Freedom, which he reiterated 
many times throughout his book:  
It is the thesis of this book that modern man, freed from the bonds of pre-individualistic society, 
which simultaneously gave him security and limited him, has not gained freedom in the positive 
sense of the realization of his individual self; that is, the expression of his intellectual, emotional 
and sensuous potentialities. Freedom, though it has brought him independence and rationality, has 
made him isolate and, thereby, anxious and powerless. This isolation is unbearable and the 
alternatives he is confronted with are either to escape from the burden of his freedom into new 
dependencies and submission, or to advance to the full realization of positive freedom which is 
based upon the uniqueness and individuality of man.98  
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Fromm was particularly concerned with the psychological effects of the dialectical nature of 
freedom; the ability for humans to reason, which he significantly emphasized, on the one hand, 
and the anxiety humans experience as a result on the other. Negative freedom, that is the 
severing of external restraints, can precipitate both sentiments. The isolating character of 
negative freedom, which Fromm argued is the only way Enlightenment thinkers often understand 
freedom, causes people to seek refuge from its harmful effects. This “escape” can take many 
forms, and his historical analysis showed that such escapes vary depending on the historical 
setting. During the renaissance and early capitalism, for example, society was upended, and the 
lower classes in particular found themselves uncertain of their role in the world. As a result, 
Fromm argued that many found comfort in the “authoritarianism” offered by Luther and Calvin; 
the Protestant Reformation, he reasoned, like the rise of Nazism, provided security through 
submission.99  
In fact, the ways in which mankind repeatedly attempts to escape the burden of negative 
freedom is historically and dialectically homologous, he insisted, for instance, “Once man was 
ready to become nothing but the means for the glory of a God who represented neither justice 
nor love, he was sufficiently prepared to accept the role of a servant to the economic machine- 
and eventually a ‘Fürher.’”100 Therefore, the destruction of human relationships under capitalism, 
its previously mentioned “commodification,” and its competitive nature pitted humans against 
each other. As Fromm argued, “All human relationships were poisoned by this fierce life-and-
death struggle for the maintenance of power and wealth.”101 Once these relationships were 
                                               
99 Lutheranism and Calvinism, which Fromm compares to Nazism, demanded obedience, and the complete 
submission to God’s will. Calvinism in particular demanded an “escape from freedom” through the idea of 
predetermination, which completely removed any possible feelings of doubt, one is born either damned, or saved.  
100 Ibid, 111 
101 Fromm, Escape From Freedom, 48 
Mantell 29 
sufficiently poisoned the conditions were manifest— put simply, humanity’s willingness to 
submit to the unfreedom and inhumanity of capitalism in turn facilitated an eventual submission 
to fascism. 
However, Fromm also diverged somewhat from Adorno’s dialectical analysis of 
Enlightenment and fascism, as well as Marcuse’s. Even though the Enlightenment laid the 
foundations for fascism, primarily as it contributed to the expansion of capitalism, for Fromm, 
fascism was also a reaction against the Enlightenment. Hence his dialectical interpretation; the 
conditions which the Enlightenment helped to create, in the name of freedom, were both positive 
and negative. Though man became isolated, man also became “rational” and “responsible.”102 
Fascism was a response not to the “positive” character of freedom, but to its “negative” 
character, and as a result, fascism rejected entirely the positive character of freedom, which in 
many ways Fromm defines in accordance with Enlightenment ideals. As Fromm himself points 
out, he defined it in accordance with many of the values espoused by humanist philosophy, 
values such as “human dignity, individuality, and strength.”103 Fascism, of course, remains in 
opposition to those values.  
Thus, the Enlightenment, and even capitalism, is not entirely bad, it is only bad insofar as 
it helped engender feelings of isolation and powerlessness (negative freedom). The reverse is 
also true; it is good insofar as it helped increase positive freedom. He argued, “...capitalism not 
only freed man from traditional bonds, but it also contributed tremendously to the increasing of 
positive freedom, to the growth of an active, critical, responsible self.”104 The severing of 
primary, external ties, allowed individuals to develop their capabilities to reason, which for 
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Fromm was an important historical and psychological development.105 Fascism is an 
abandonment of this ability to reason because it requires “blind obedience to a leader.”106 Reason 
itself is not fascism’s cause, but in fact one of the few beneficial, indeed “positive,” 
consequences of the Enlightenment and capitalism. In Fromm’s thought, fascism is a reaction to 
this development of reason, rather than its culmination; Fascism accentuated the negative, rather 
than the positive. 
Marcuse postulated a different diagnosis of fascism, however, and instead argued that 
fascism arose not out of a deficiency of positive freedom, but in part because of a nineteenth 
century philosophical inclination toward positivism and empiricism, which resided on 
Enlightenment notions of “reason.”107 In fact, his entire conception of “negative dialectics” was 
in opposition toward the positive/positivist way of thinking he believed was rooted in the 
Enlightenment. For Marcuse, and much of the Frankfurt School, positivistic “ideologies”108 were 
also affirmative ideologies because any criticism that results from them are only done so in 
accordance with a perceived reality. This “factual” reality, in dialectical terms, is only a “stage of 
a single process— a process in which subject and object are so joined that truth can be 
determined only within the subject-object totality.”109 In other words, positivism and “positive 
thinking” is also undialectical thinking, it ignores the subjectivity that “constitutes the objective 
world” through ignoring dialectical and historical processes, but more importantly through 
                                               
105 Ibid, 35 
106 Ibid, 211 
107Positivism is defined as “a philosophical system that holds that every rationally justifiable assertion can be 
scientifically verified or is capable of logical or mathematical proof, and that therefore rejects metaphysics and 
theism.” Marcuse argues that positivism was defined in opposition to Hegel’s “negative” philosophy, which was 
seen as metaphysical.  
108 Marcuse, and much of the Frankfurt School saw positivism, empiricism, positive philosophy, and even science as 
subjective ideologies. 
109 Marcuse, Reason and Revolution, vii  
Mantell 31 
failing to realize “that which is real opposes and denies the potentialities inherent in itself.”110 
Moreover, this positivity renders negative thinking as merely “speculative,” unrealistic, or even 
utopian.111  
Indeed, positive thinking, to Marcuse, is “not merely immoral; it is false.”112 It is faulty 
thinking namely because it ignores the potentials which “common sense” and the established 
facts rule out. It is immoral because it leads to a “distrust of all values which transcend the facts 
of observation.”113 Yet, it is also immoral for very tangible reasons, Marcuse argued that fascist 
interpretations of Hegel, for instance, were made possible due to positive flaws in Hegel’s own 
philosophy. He claimed: 
Dialectical thought has not hindered Hegel from developing his philosophy into a neat and 
comprehensive system which, in the end, accentuates the positive emphatically. I believe it is the 
idea of Reason itself which is the undialectical element in Hegel’s philosophy. This idea of 
Reason comprehends everything and ultimately absolves everything, because it has its place and 
function in the whole, and the whole is beyond good and evil, truth and falsehood. It may even be 
justifiable, logically as well as historically, to define Reason in terms which include slavery, the 
Inquisition, child labor, concentration camps, gas chambers, and nuclear preparedness.114 
 
For example, Marcuse believed that the Italian fascists leaned towards Hegel’s position in efforts 
to achieve “an efficient bureaucracy, a centralized administration, a rationalized industry, and a 
complete military preparedness…” which Marcuse defines as “positive” tasks.115 In the context 
of 1941, the danger of positivity lies in excusing, even providing the justification for fascism and 
totalitarianism.  
Hegel’s concept of reason was especially problematic to Marcuse. Often it takes on both 
an ambiguous and objective character. Marcuse argued that Hegel believed in the existence of 
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“objective concepts and principles” that “denote universally valid conditions and norms.” The 
totality of these concepts, according to Marcuse, Hegel called reason.116 Indeed, reason can then 
justify both liberation and enslavement. In fact, reason forms the basis for positivist ways of 
thinking, and in practical terms, the rationalization and mechanization of society. Under 
capitalism, reason justified the rational and technical organization of society in the name of 
efficiency, and as a result Marcuse argued, submission to this society became the only reasonable 
act. In one essay written in 1941 he obeserved:  
The system of life created by modern industry is one of the highest expediency, convenience and 
efficiency. Reason, once defined in these terms, becomes equivalent to an activity which 
perpetuates this world. Rational behavior becomes identical with a matter-of-factness which 
teaches reasonable submissiveness and thus guarantees getting along in the prevailing order.117 
 
For Marcuse, this technical reason eventually came to justify the worst endeavors of the Third 
Reich, which was sustained “by the ingenious manipulation of the power inherent in technology: 
the intensification of labor, propaganda, the training of youths and workers, the organization of 
the governmental, industrial and party bureaucracy — all of which constitute the daily 
implements of terror — follow the lines of greatest technological efficiency.”118 This was made 
possible due to the simultaneous rise of positivism which “promoted the march of free thought, 
especially in the natural sciences.”119 Reason “as the developing and applied knowledge of man 
— as ‘free thought’ — was instrumental in creating the world we live in” and as such it was also 
“instrumental in sustaining injustice, toil and suffering.”120 In a way, the reification of reason as 
an ambiguous and idealistic term under capitalism came to render it yet another repressive tool 
of the prevailing social order, a justification of injustice and the objectification of humans.  
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In his analysis of reason, however, Marcuse remained a dialectician. He argued, 
somewhat paradoxically, that reason does not abdicate “its claim to confront reality with the 
truth about reality.”121 In fact, “Reason and Reason alone, contains its own corrective.”122 It is 
difficult to understand the forcefulness of Marcuse’s critique of reason in light of his 
simultaneous reverence for it, but his position is useful for understanding not only his dialectical 
methods but also the crucial differences between his thought and Fromm’s. Marcuse’s dialectical 
interpretation of reason shows that it is not only contradictory, but also that reason itself tends 
toward its own negation. Fascism is the perfect example of the contradictory tendency of reason, 
for that which is “reasonable” becomes increasingly “unreasonable.” Marcuse argued: “Faced 
with fascist barbarism, everyone knows what freedom means, and everyone is aware of the 
irrationality in the prevailing rationality.”123 The apparent rationality of totalitarian society is 
rendered irrational as it slips into barbarism.  
Of course, according to Marcuse, the only way to determine its unreasonableness is 
through the use of reason itself. Reason cannot be substituted for “extrarational” standards but 
instead must be driven “to recognize the extent to which it is still unreasonable.”124 Hegel’s (and 
other thinker’s) use of reason then, was only flawed insofar as they “accepted the specific 
historical form of reason reached at his time as the reality of Reason.”125 In other words, reason 
itself is not spurious, but the context is in which it is “defined and proclaimed.”126 Because it was 
defined, indeed advanced by the prevailing social order, it became itself repressive; an accessory 
“to the enslavement of man.”127 
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If we follow Marcuse’s logic, Fromm’s use of reason was equally flawed. As Fromm 
himself pointed out, society and his conception of reason are compatible, society can even 
promote reason.128 But in Marcuse’s negative dialectical terms, so long as “the negative,” that is, 
the negation of freedom by repressive society, persists, its purported values will necessarily be 
repressive as well. Moreover, the critical nature of reason, that is the “negative” aspect to it and 
the aspect to it which Marcuse values, is “incompatible” with the prevailing social order. In order 
to make it compatible critical reason must become technical reason, or “positive” reason. In 
Marcuse’s thought capitalist society cannot encourage critical, or “negative” reason, for that 
would necessitate its destruction; it can only exist in opposition to repressive society.  
For Marcuse, Fromm’s conception of reason was necessarily the acceptance of its 
traditional definition because Fromm argued that capitalism, for all of its brutality, still provoked 
the growth of an individual’s capacity to reason, not as an opposing force, but as a supportive 
force. In Marcuse’s terms, Fromm’s conception of reason erred in its positivism. It is perhaps 
less surprising then, that Marcuse would wield his own dialectical logic against Fromm in the 
Dissent debate, arguing that Fromm fails to acknowledge the “totality” of technocratic rational 
society, and as a result adheres to the conformist notion “accentuate the positive.”129 In light of 
both men’s aforementioned position on individuality, in which the individual is incapable of 
transcending societal conditions, encouraging the individual to reason without removing the 
repressive conditions which prevent him from doing so is “faulty logic” and merely lends a 
fictitious legitimacy to the social order. In Marcuse’s view, Fromm was abandoning this 
dialectical position. 
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Marcuse’s dialectical position will eventually come to serve as the thesis of One-
Dimensional Man, where he wrote “technical progress, extended to a whole system of 
domination and coordination, creates forms of life (and of power) which appear to reconcile the 
forces opposing the system and to defeat or refute all protest in the name of the historical 
prospects of freedom from toil and domination.”130 In light of this, there is a tension within 
Marcuse’s thought which Fromm avoided: Marcuse’s own use of reason, if he is right, must be 
compatible with this system of domination. Perhaps one of the most famous Marcuse critics, 
Alasdair MacIntyre, astutely wrote:  
The central oddity of One-Dimensional Man is perhaps that it should have been written at all. For 
if its thesis were true, then we should have to ask how the book came to have been written and we 
would certainly have to inquire whether it would find any readers. Or rather, to the extent that the 
book does find readers, to that extent Marcuse’s thesis does not hold.131 
 
Fromm’s own position is then lent a significant legitimacy; in many ways Marcuse is the foil to 
his own argument, the embodiment of critical reason in a society that, according to him, is 
incompatible with critical reason. Of course, this tension is a dialectical one, even if it is 
apparently paradoxical. Still, if Fromm appears somewhat less critical of capitalist society — a 
charge Marcuse levied against him in the Dissent debate — for Fromm admitted to both its 
negative and positive aspects, he also offered a dialectical analysis that avoids this contradiction. 
Moreover, in Fromm’s own analysis of Reason, he criticized capitalist society without arguing 
against the very tool he wields to articulate his criticism. Indeed, he showed how, at the same 
time, modern society can both impede on individual reason and promote individual reason, 
whereas Marcuse believes reason itself is dialectical, and thus flawed, and even repressive. In the 
next chapter, I demonstrate how Marcuse will attempt to reconcile this contradiction using 
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negative dialectics to offer a “chance for alternatives” while Fromm, using his own version of 
dialectics, will attempt to offer solutions that mitigate the harmful effects of negative freedom, 
and thereby emphasize positive freedom and the individual’s capacity to reason.   
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Chapter 2: Potentialities at Conflict 
 In the last chapter I established that despite sharing a broad critique of modernity and late 
capitalist society, Erich Fromm and Herbert Marcuse offered conflicting interpretations of 
human history, freedom, and especially reason. In this chapter, I argue that as a result of the 
differences in how they interpreted the dialectical progress of history they arrived at vastly 
different “answers” and prescriptions for human action to combat the perceived ills of capitalism. 
While they both attempted to paint a picture of a better future, the pictures appear spectacularly 
different. The fact that Marcuse and Fromm even endeavored to answer this question actually 
reveals them as outliers within the Frankfurt School; few Frankfurt School thinkers dared to 
imagine the possibility for a better future, let alone imagine what that future could look like. As 
leading thinkers of the Frankfurt School, Adorno and Horkheimer undoubtedly rejected the 
potential for revolutionary change, and even the notion that action (individual or collective) 
could curb the harmful effects of capitalism. Although that pessimism also influenced Marcuse 
in particular, it did not prevent him from articulating a relatively optimistic alternative for 
capitalist society, although his alternative demanded an absolute departure from capitalism. This 
departure Marcuse called The Great Refusal, and in alignment with his negative dialectics, called 
for an absolute negation of the present society. Fromm, because he saw dialectics in a more 
traditional way that hearkened back to Hegel and Marx, with the positive existing within the 
negative, he instead argued to emphasize the possibility for positive freedom and change in small 
and incremental ways. Similarly, his belief in the Enlightenment concept of reason lends him to 
offer solutions rooted in Enlightenment notions. He did not necessarily argue to totally dispose 
of capitalism, but instead to embrace the contradictory elements within capitalism, the anti-
capitalist and the human aspects of society.  
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Spontaneous Activity, Love and Happiness 
Fromm’s argument finds its earliest formulations in 1941, in Escape From Freedom. 
Fromm had originally intended Escape From Freedom to serve as an analysis and a diagnosis, 
rather than a solution, or prescription. Allegedly, he based his writing on “painstaking 
observations” and he never meant to design nor argue for a particular political or social order.132 
Nevertheless, he drew conclusions that brought with them implications for human action and 
serve as the germ for his prescriptive theories which he thoroughly detailed about fifteen years 
later in The Sane Society (1955), and The Art of Loving (1956). 
In Escape From Freedom Fromm concluded that positive freedom would at its best, 
allow for man’s “active solidarity with all men and his spontaneous activity, love and work, 
which unite him again with the world, not by primary ties but as a free and independent 
individual.”133 Under capitalism, love, fulfilling work, and especially spontaneous activity are 
restricted. Indeed, there are many methods, according to Fromm, that can be applied in order to 
facilitate an increase of positive freedom and thereby allow for spontaneous activity. However, 
throughout Escape From Freedom, Fromm holds that in order to create a society that encourages 
the aforementioned values, one must simply begin to act spontaneously, insofar as they are able 
to. Such action does not require a grand altering of the social order; it does not require 
revolution.134  
Fromm argued that the restriction of spontaneous activity was one of the most harmful 
effects of capitalist society. It is unsurprising, then, that Fromm believed its encouragement 
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could serve as the solution to “the problem of freedom.” He claimed, “The basic dichotomy that 
is inherent in freedom- the birth of individuality and the pain of aloneness- is dissolved on a 
higher plane by man’s spontaneous action.”135 Importantly, he described this in dialectical terms; 
spontaneous action is the resolution of otherwise irresolvable contradictions, since it allows 
humans to act as individuals without isolating them. Spontaneous action, in simple terms, is the 
dialectical synthesis of modern individuality and the isolation it engenders. While Fromm is 
hesitant here to articulate how one achieves this resolution of thesis (individuality) and antithesis 
(aloneness), he did put forth the notion that spontaneous activity manifests itself most clearly in 
love: 
Spontaneous activity is the one way in which man can overcome the terror of aloneness without 
sacrificing the integrity of his self; for in the spontaneous realization of the self man unites 
himself anew with the world - with man, nature, and himself. Love is the foremost component of 
such spontaneity; not love as the dissolution of the self in another person, not love as the 
possession of another person, but love as spontaneous affirmation of others, as the union of the 
individual with others on the basis of the preservation of the individual self. 136 
 
Fromm will later dedicate an entire book to this concept of love, which he held throughout his 
career as the most “vital act of rebellion.”137 But, there is another component for spontaneous 
activity that is crucial to understanding his solution: work.  
Work has always played a unique role in the theories of professed Marxists. At once both 
the subject of obvious criticism, for all of its oppression and alienation, it was also seen as 
necessary to a communist society, and even more necessary for human fulfillment. Marx himself 
believed as much, and Fromm remained far more loyal to that concept than other members of the 
Frankfurt School. He argued: 
Work is the other component [of spontaneous action]; not work as a compulsive activity in order 
to escape aloneness, not work as a relationship to nature which is partly one of dominating her, 
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partly one of worship of and enslavement by the very products of man’s hands, but work as 
creation in which man becomes one with nature in the act of creation.138 
 
Of course, this kind of unalienated, fulfilling work is entirely different from that which most of 
us know today, but it is not completely foreign to us either. In The Sane Society, Fromm further 
developed this idea. He admitted, for example, “most of us assume that the kind of work current 
in our society, namely, alienated work, is the only kind there is…” but he asked his reader to 
observe children, and acknowledge other kinds of work to convince us “that we long to spend 
our energy on something meaningful, that we feel refreshed if we can do so, and that we are 
quite willing to accept rational authority if what we are doing makes sense.”139 As a matter of 
fact, Fromm will only further embrace this reverence for work, in 1961 he wrote in Marx’s 
Concept of Man:  
Man is alive only inasmuch as he is productive, inasmuch as he grasps the world outside of 
himself in the act of expressing his own specific human powers, and of grasping the world with 
these powers. Inasmuch as man is not productive, inasmuch as he is receptive and passive, he is 
nothing, he is dead.140 
 
His conviction expressed here plays a fundamental role in constructing his vision for alternatives. 
In fact, The Sane Society reads more like an immediate blueprint for action than it does a critical 
condemnation of modern society. 
In the last section of his book, “Roads to Sanity” Fromm argued that “the only 
constructive solution is that of Socialism” which required for him, a complete “reorganization of 
our economic and social system” to create “a social order in which human solidarity, reason and 
productiveness are furthered rather than hobbled.”141 Of course, the type of socialism Fromm 
envisioned is vastly different from that of Stalinism, or authoritarian communism, which Fromm 
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repeatedly reminded his reader of throughout Sane Society. Instead, he called his vision “socialist 
humanism.”142 Indeed, he is equally critical of the brand of communism practiced in the Soviet 
Union at the time as he is of capitalism in the west, if not more so.  
Despite arguing for, or at least implying that, a new social order is necessary to realize 
socialist humanism, he dedicated a sizable portion of his book toward articulating “practical 
suggestions” and what he called a “political transformation.”143 Nearly all of the suggestions he 
made are possible under the confines of capitalism, and Marcuse will eventually argue, in the 
Dissent debate, they are even supported by and supportive of capitalist values.144 For example, 
Fromm asserted pointedly that in order to increase workers participation, and thus alleviate some 
of the harmful effects of alienation, workers should organize and buy up stocks of their own 
company, or have their labor union leaders buy stocks on their behalf.145 Their work, in Fromm’s 
view, would then become immediately more fulfilling, since workers would have a stake in their 
own firms success, and reap a portion of the profits they helped generate (rather than working for 
a fixed wage).146  
Fromm similarly invited his readership to hearken back to the early American town hall. 
In an almost Rousseauian way, he advocated for “Town Meetings,” which without going into 
superfluous detail, would be comprised of five hundred or so local residents. Fromm reasoned: 
In such small groups the issues at stake can be discussed thoroughly, each member can express 
his ideas, can listen to, and discuss reasonably other arguments. People have personal contact 
with each other, which makes it more difficult for demagogic and irrational influences to work on 
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their minds… the individual citizen must be in the possession of vital facts which enables him to 
make a reasonable decision.147 
 
The decisions each town arrives at, through face-to-face interactions, would then be 
communicated to nationally elected representatives, which would share equal power in the 
decision making. Fromm believed these changes would humanize American democracy, since it 
would require human interaction and deliberation as the condition for all decisions, the decision 
would then be communicated from “below to above” which would result in an overall more 
democratic process, as well as a more social and less alienating process. 
Fromm argued the efficacy of such meetings would be reliant on the availability of 
“factual information” and so, perhaps surprisingly, he advocated for establishing a “politically 
independent cultural agency” made up of “personalities from the fields of art, sciences, religion, 
business, politics, whose outstanding achievements and moral integrity are beyond doubt…”148  
Their political positions, Fromm conceptualized, would vary, but they would be able to agree on 
“objective” facts. These proposals have led even the most generous readers of Fromm to fault 
him for offering sketchy proposals at best, and Marcuse would later take it several steps further 
and argue his proposals are far from radical, and merely provide credence for capitalist 
society.149 
Still, the proposals Fromm offered are in general alignment with his broad critique of 
capitalist society. After all, Fromm’s dialectical analysis of capitalism concluded that although it 
isolated and alienated mankind it also empowered mankind, and contributed to the “growth of an 
active, critical, responsible self.”150 As such, his ideas were based on the perceived unlikeliness 
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of establishing a truly, completely, socialist society in the near future, and instead were meant to 
accentuate the positive freedoms which capitalism brought about and thereby temper its more 
negative freedoms.  
 
Marcuse’s Problem With Affirmation 
There are several aspects of Fromm’s suggestions that remain at odds with much of 
Marcuse’s theories. For instance, Fromm’s belief that a Town Meeting would strengthen and 
humanize American democracy is problematic from Marcuse’s dialectical position because it is 
merely reliant on facts, which Marcuse believed to be subjectively determined by the prevailing 
social order.151 In the case of Fromm’s Town Meeting, such a democratic program is not only 
insufficiently critical but is affirmative of the prevailing order. According to Marcuse, if a 
behavior or mode of thought “surrenders to the immediate facts, it repels recognition of the 
factors behind the facts, and thus repels recognition of the facts, and of their historical 
content.”152 For Marcuse, Fromm ignored the dialectical process, because facts are arbitrarily 
determined only within a “stage” of development, and this stage determines their character and 
function; to ignore this historical reality is tantamount to an endorsement of capitalism and 
repressive society.153 Within this framework, Marcuse concluded that even apparently objective 
facts are both oppressive and “ideological,” and it is the task of Critical Theory to make their 
political and repressive nature apparent.154 Indeed, the value of Critical Theory for Marcuse rests 
on its “explosive” content, that is if it remains in total opposition to the prevailing social order; 
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Fromm’s Town Hall is wholly antithetical to Critical Theory and dialectical thinking because it 
“stabilizes” accepted facts “within the repressive whole” which in turn yields itself to “this 
whole.”155 It is unsurprising that Marcuse explicitly criticized Fromm in the Dissent debate, even 
if he wrongly rooted that criticism in psychoanalysis; a theory which accepts the given facts must 
be conformist in nature. 
Marcuse’s rejection of Fromm’s theories within the Dissent debate is mostly rooted in 
psychoanalysis, however, they also both alluded to the concept of dialectics intermittently 
throughout. For example, in what may be one of his most forceful rebukes of Fromm, Marcuse 
argued that, “in an anti-liberal society, individual happiness and productive development are in 
contradiction to society; if they are defined as values to be realized within this society, they 
become themselves repressive.”156 If we apply this logic to Fromm’s overarching solutions, the 
problem with his attempt to emphasize productive love and fulfilling work is that, in Marcuse’s 
view, it doesn’t adequately take into account the context in which those values are being 
proclaimed, namely, the context of capitalism. Marcuse further, and more specifically, 
inveighed: 
Fromm revives all the time-honored values of idealistic ethics as if nobody had ever demonstrated 
their conformistic and repressive features. He talks of the productive realization of the 
personality, of care, responsibility, and respect for one's fellow men, of productive love and 
happiness as if man could actually practice all this and still remain sane and full of "wellbeing" in 
a society which Fromm himself describes as one of total alienation, dominated by the commodity 
relations of the "market."157 
 
Again, while he was specifically referring to Fromm’s interpretation of certain psychoanalytic 
concepts, his critique is derived from his dialectical understanding of society. The consequences 
for Marcuse are expressed in clear, though implicit, dialectical terms; happiness and love are 
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proclaimed in such a way that “leaves the negative where it is—predominant over the human 
existence.”158 In other words, Marcuse believed Fromm’s approach overemphasizes an 
individual’s ability to overcome the conditions of repressive society, which does not allow for 
“authentic” happiness or love, because they are incompatible with capitalism.159 Instead, society 
defines these terms (happiness, love, responsibility) in such a way that renders them compatible 
with itself. Therefore, to practice happiness or love within its established definitions only 
authenticates society and its repression. Because Fromm’s solutions (such as his town hall or 
Employee-Stock Ownership Plans) accepts the established definitions, it will not negate the 
capitalist order and would thereby do nothing to liberate humanity. In concrete terms, for 
Marcuse, compulsion to partake in a town hall is hardly a liberating concept. In fact, a few years 
after the Dissent exchange, in 1958, the American philosopher Isaiah Berlin echoed and clarified 
Marcuse’s position by arguing against the “positive” notion of liberty, because it relies on 
“compulsion,” and risks becoming authoritative.160 Even if Fromm’s ideas are far from 
authoritative, at best, according to Marcuse, they would merely lead to a “smoother functioning 
of the established society” rather than a departure.161  
In all fairness to Fromm, Marcuse’s polemical attack on him is now widely considered 
gratuitous. Although parts of The Sane Society appear more suited for a political platform (a 
harsh insult for a member of the Frankfurt School) rather than a book of Critical Theory, it 
remains an undeniably forceful critique of capitalist society.162 Marcuse has been faulted for 
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failing to acknowledge the many denunciations of capitalism which Fromm made throughout 
Escape From Freedom, and The Sane Society. 
But, I am convinced that Marcuse did not acknowledge those criticisms on the grounds 
that Fromm made them in such a way that, from his perspective, are more aligned with a 
philosophical tradition that was hostile toward Critical Theory and negative thinking in general. 
Perhaps, one that reminded Marcuse of “positive” philosophy or “positivism.” In One-
Dimensional Man, which came out nearly a decade after the Fromm-Marcuse debate, Marcuse 
stated: 
To the degree to which the given reality is scientifically comprehended and transformed, to the 
degree to which society becomes industrial and technological, positivism finds in the society the 
medium for the realization (and validation) of its concepts - harmony between theory and 
practice, truth and facts. Philosophic thought turns into affirmative thought; the philosophic 
critique criticizes within the societal framework and stigmatizes non-positive notions as mere 
speculation, dreams, or fantasies.163 
 
Fromm’s construction of the “road to sanity” sought to harmonize theory and practice and find 
reconciliation between truth and facts. However, the obvious realizability of Fromm’s design, 
which attracted many young radicals to him, became not an advantage but a fault in his work.164 
Though it remained critical of society, and even capitalism, because its solutions were 
compatible with that same very society rendered it at odds with the negative thinking that 
Marcuse championed. One could make the argument here that the fact Fromm even offered 
practical solutions at all left him little chance of avoiding Marcuse’s wrath. 
Of course, if Marcuse was opposed to practical political solutions of any sort, in the name 
of negative thinking, then his own theories appear useless, or just become criticism for the sake 
of criticism. Like Karl Popper’s condemnation of Adorno and Horkheimer, he too appears only 
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to revile contemporary society without offering hope for a better future, or at least one that seems 
presently attainable. As it happens, Fromm argued exactly that. Fromm wrote that if one is to 
take Marcuse’s positions seriously “than any person who has integrity and is capable of love and 
happiness, in present-day capitalistic society, must either become a martyr or insane.”165 In short, 
Marcuse espoused a nihilistic philosophy. 
Their theoretical differences come back again to their divergent interpretation of how 
history functions dialectically: 
It is amazing that Marcuse should neglect his own dialectical position to the extent of drawing a 
black and white picture, and forget that the alienated society already develops in itself the 
elements which contradict it. To equate a rebel with a martyr in Western capitalistic society is 
rather unrealistic, unless somebody is so deeply conformist that to be a rebel to him means to be a 
martyr. If Marcuse were right, then indeed we would have to arrive at the conclusion that there is 
no place for love and happiness whatsoever in capitalistic society. The only difference between 
the average man and the "radical thinker," then, is that the average man is an opportunistic 
automaton without knowing it, while the radical thinker is the same, but knowing it.166  
 
In other words, though Fromm agreed with Marcuse that capitalist society is one of alienation 
and isolation, as a result of his positive-negative dialectic, Fromm concluded the values that 
contradict alienation (solidarity, fulfilment, etc.…) still find themselves within capitalism. 
Fromm merely wanted to emphasize those values. Marcuse, in contrast, believed that positive 
thinking, indeed anything apparently affirmative would, in fact, insidiously fortify capitalist 
civilization and its resilience. In some ways, their argument evokes the rather tired one of 
“reform versus revolution.” Fromm believed that Marcuse’s dialectics require the complete 
dehumanization of man before liberation can occur, whereas he maintained that “to study the 
conditions of love and integrity means to discover the reasons for their failure in capitalistic 
society; that the analysis of love is social criticism; that to attempt to practice these virtues 
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amounts to the most vital act of rebellion.”167 Though he was critical of capitalism, Fromm held 
on to the belief that the practice of love, happiness, fulfillment, and solidarity was ultimately 
possible within a capitalist society. In fact, he argued that because society inhibits their 
realization, to attempt to practice these virtues is not conformist but, on the contrary, “amounts to 
the most vital act of rebellion.”168 Ultimately, this leads Fromm to conclude that Marcuse’s 
position was an “example of human nihilism disguised as radicalism”169 a title which Marcuse 
proudly accepted, “‘Nihilism,’ as the indictment of inhuman conditions, may be a truly humanist 
attitude— part of the Great Refusal to play the game, to compromise with the bad ‘positive.’ In 
this sense, I accept Fromm's designation of my position as "human nihilism.”170 With that, 
Marcuse introduced what will later become the name for his “solution” for how one could 
respond to the all-encompassing degradation of capitalist society; The Great Refusal.  
  
The Great Refusal 
For much of his career Marcuse was reluctant to offer prescriptions for what one should 
do with his particularly negative analysis, a fact which he receives a fair amount of criticism 
for.171 Yet, as the fifties turned into the sixties, Marcuse began to see the possibilities for radical 
social change. In fact, he placed far more faith in the student movement of the sixties than did 
any other member of the Frankfurt School.172 Although Marcuse remained a fairly pessimistic 
thinker, and relative to Fromm much more pessimistic, the liberation struggles of the sixties 
caused him to challenge his colleagues within the Institute for Social Research to “confront the 
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critical theory of society with the task of re-examining the prospects for the emergence of a 
socialist society qualitatively different from existing societies, the task of redefining socialism 
and its preconditions.”173 Marcuse’s belief in the potential for a radically different society 
repeatedly holds that such a society must be a complete departure from the one that exists. In that 
way, his imagined alternatives mirror the premise for his negative dialectics: he continued to 
reject “positivistic” notions and only supported absolute systemic change.  
Marcuse endeavored to describe his vision as “utopian” and attempted to rescue the word 
from adverse connotations. In words that borrow from his critique of positivism, Marcuse 
declared:  
I will not be deterred by one of the most vicious ideologies of today, namely, the ideology which 
derogates, denounces and ridicules the most decisive concepts and images of a free society as 
merely ‘utopian’ and ‘only’ speculative. It may well be that precisely in those aspects of 
socialism which are today ridiculed as utopian, lies the decisive difference, the contrast between 
an authentic socialist society and the established societies, even the most advanced industrial 
societies.174 
 
His belief in the potential for an alternative society is one that, at its core, holds onto the 
possibility for the complete negation of the established society. If positive philosophy can be 
faulted for the fact that it only makes criticisms that accept the values of the prevailing social 
order, a positive philosophic solution similarly only offers solutions under those same conditions. 
Marcuse’s alternative, in that way, is entirely a negative alternative, since it seeks to “transcend” 
what the given facts and common sense put forth; it seeks to transcend what one may consider 
possible. 
Moreover, Marcuse’s belief in the realizability of an entirely new society was reliant on 
his own theory of the historical dialectic, which led him to conclude that society tends toward its 
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own negation. For example, early in his career in 1941 Marcuse argued that technical progress 
serves a dialectical function, “Technics by itself can promote authoritarianism as well as liberty, 
scarcity as well as abundance, the extension as well as the abolition of toil.”175 Marcuse saw 
technology as an oppressive and dehumanizing force; its perceived neutrality merely further 
subjected individuals to an increasingly efficient and decreasingly human enterprise.176 Likewise, 
as history unfolds the contradiction within technological progress, like the contradiction within 
Reason, becomes ever more exacerbated. Indeed, writing in 1964, Marcuse observed that men 
and machinery were increasingly organized in the name of “rational” efficiency, which 
dehumanized them, but that same time led to a higher standard of living. Moreover, Marcuse 
believed technology held the promise that mankind could be free from alienated labor 
altogether.177 The possibility, then, for a “pacified existence” through technical means actually 
resides on the technological process itself. Marcuse argued, “the range of verifiability in this 
sense grows in the course of history. Thus, the speculations about the Good Life, the Good 
Society, Permanent Peace, obtain an increasingly realistic content; on technological grounds, the 
metaphysical tends to become physical.”178 Marcuse went on to say: 
 … “neutral” scientific method and technology become the science and technology of a historical phase 
which is being surpassed by its own achievements- which has reached its own negation. Instead of being 
separated from science and scientific method, and left to subjective preference and irrational, 
transcendental sanction, formerly metaphysical ideas of liberation may become the proper object of 
science. But this development confronts science with the unpleasant task of becoming political- of 
recognizing scientific consciousness as political consciousness, and the scientific enterprise as political 
enterprise. For the transformation of values into needs, of final causes into technical possibilities is a new 
stage in the conquest of oppressive, unmastered forces in society as well as in nature. It is an act of 
liberation.179  
  
                                               
175 Marcuse, “Some Implications of Modern Technology,” 139 
176 Ibid, 141 
177 Marcuse, One-Dimensional Man, 229-230 
178 Ibid, 230 
179 Ibid, 233 (emphasis in original text) 
Mantell 51 
The act of liberation here is the complete negation of technical rationality, and even that of 
“positivistic” science, for they would no longer serve the purportedly “objective” ambitions of 
the established social order, but the purposes, indeed “values” of humankind. Marcuse offered an 
example of how science and technology can serve human liberation: 
...what is calculable is the minimum of labor with which, and the extent to which, the vital needs 
of all members of a society could be satisfied- provided the available resources were used for this 
end, without being restricted by other interests, and without impeding the accumulation of capital 
necessary for the development of the respective society… that is, quantifiable is the possible 
reduction of anxiety, the possible freedom from fear.180 
 
Indeed, although his ideas remain undoubtedly a vast departure from the ways in which science 
and technology are often utilized, the possibility for freedom from scarcity and repression appear 
possible, at least from an organizational perspective. 
Perhaps the most important historical shift that permits Marcuse to entertain utopian 
possibilities is that he had hoped to find a “revolutionary subject” within the civil rights 
movement and student activism of the 1960s. I will discuss this further in the next chapter, but it 
is important to briefly mention that, in One-Dimensional Man, Marcuse wrote that the social 
order could be destroyed as a result of acts by people of color who “have the most real need for 
ending intolerable conditions and institutions.”181 Indeed, students and other activists in the 
1960s, to Marcuse, were the “new proletariat,” or, rather, a proletarian surrogate. Echoing Marx, 
he argued that “their opposition is revolutionary even if their consciousness is not.”182 To be 
sure, his newfound hope remained dialectical; the conditions were intolerable enough at this 
time, and the protests sufficiently “negative” that perhaps capitalism had reached its 
“determinate negation”; its own oppressiveness causing its downfall. Still, Marcuse admitted that 
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revolutionary change at this time had “nothing but a chance.” True to his pessimism, Marcuse 
asserted “The critical theory of society possesses no concepts which could bridge the gap 
between the present and its future; holding no promise and showing no success, it remains 
negative.”183 Even as Marcuse articulated a more hopeful position, he remained uncertain about 
its efficacy.  
In an effort to rectify their relationship, Marcuse asked Fromm to review One-
Dimensional Man before it was published in 1964. Fromm refused initially, and remarked to one 
friend that “our right-wing enemies” are the only ones who would benefit if he attacked Marcuse 
as Marcuse attacked him.184 Eventually though Fromm did carefully read One-Dimensional Man, 
and in another letter, Fromm echoed many of the same general sentiments he articulated in the 
debate, mainly that Marcuse revealed an “alienation and despair masquerading as radicalism.”185 
Fromm saw Marcuse’s remedy as merely a symptom of his “nihilism”; the only way out for 
Marcuse was complete destruction of society as we know it. Moreover, there are certain aspects 
of Marcuse’s utopian vision that appear at odds with Fromm’s thinking, namely, in the way 
which freedom would manifest in Marcuse’s thought. We know, for instance, that Fromm and 
Marcuse conceive of freedom differently; Marcuse sees it only as a negative freedom (from 
anxiety and repression), whereas Fromm sees it as positive (freedom to spontaneously act, love, 
and work). Marcuse’s utopian vision, then, may further isolate mankind in Fromm’s view, since 
it does not clearly require human solidarity. At best, it only implies it.   
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Chapter 3: The Great Refusal and The Third Way 
In 1962 the Hungarian Marxist philosopher, Georg Lukács, accused Adorno, alongside 
other members of the Frankfurt School of taking up residence in “the Grand Hotel Abyss.” This 
hotel was “equipped with every comfort, on the edge of an abyss, of nothingness, of absurdity… 
The daily contemplation of the abyss between excellent meals or artistic entertainments can only 
heighten the enjoyment of the subtle comforts offered.”186 In short, Lukács charged them with 
bourgeois hypocrisy; they theorized about capitalism and its ailments while simultaneously 
enjoying every luxury it had to offer. They had much to say, and yet they did nothing. One could 
even argue, as many have, that their theories actually justified their inaction. Though in many 
regards this rang true of Adorno and some of his other colleagues, it did not for Fromm and 
Marcuse. Both men enjoyed bourgeois comforts, but they were nevertheless decidedly politically 
active.187 As outliers, Fromm and Marcuse participated in various concrete political acts, for 
Fromm, the connection between his theory and practice is more straightforward than it is for 
Marcuse, whose theory existed in some tension with his political participation, sometimes even 
in contradiction. Nonetheless, there is a significant continuity between their dialectical theories 
and their praxis; for Fromm and Marcuse their actions were motivated by their ideas. 
It is particularly interesting to compare the lives of Fromm and Marcuse, for aside from 
the fact that they were both far more politically active than their colleagues, their competing 
philosophies translated into competing lifestyles. As Stuart Jeffries points out in homage to 
Marcuse’s role in the student movement of the sixties, “After all, if we learned one thing from 
the 1960s, it was that the personal is the political.”188 As it happens, Fromm was actively 
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involved in traditional democratic politics throughout his life in the United States. In accordance 
with his belief that there are acts we can take to alleviate the harmful effects of capitalism, 
Fromm played an active role within the left-wing of the Democratic party.189 Marcuse, of course, 
did not sully himself by participating in the American political machine. And yet, he was a 
leading figure of the New Left movement in the 1960s, even directly acting as a mentor to the 
famous activist and political theorist Angela Davis. This was similarly aligned with his belief 
that the closest thing to a “revolutionary vanguard” the U.S. had were people of color and others 
excluded from the democratic establishment. Some tarred the critical theorists with accusations 
of hypocrisy, and there are definitive inconsistencies between Fromm and Marcuse’s theories 
and their political action. Yet, I argue that their theories informed much of their action. 
Moreover, because Fromm and Marcuse postulated vastly different dialectics, they participated 
in politics in vastly different ways; Fromm’s belief that capitalism is able to promote both 
positive and negative freedom encouraged him to advocate for essentially reformist policies, 
while Marcuse sought out a new, total revolution, a faith he eventually placed in the 
countercultural movement of the sixties.  
 
Fromm And Fascism  
In 1941 Fromm and Marcuse were both preoccupied with developing theories on fascism. 
This preoccupation extended to their acts; while they remained critical of capitalism both 
prioritized the fight against fascism above all else. After they published their first works in 
English they would not go on to publish significant works again until the 1950s, during which 
time they took on various roles, in Marcuse’s case including governmental roles, to combat the 
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Third Reich. For Marcuse and Fromm everything was subordinated to the urgency presented by 
Nazism in the forties. 
Fromm’s role in anti-fascist work was more personal than professional, as he never held a 
role within the government, as Marcuse had. Though he dedicated a significant amount of work 
to diagnosing fascism, throughout the thirties and forties he focused most of his time and money 
on helping his friends and family who were otherwise unable to leave Nazi Germany. As I 
mentioned, he theorized that love- healthy, and productive love- was the most radical act one 
could participate in. Ideal love was the opposite of capitalism and fascism, and so, at the height 
of the Nazi’s power, Fromm devoted himself to rescuing those he loved. After fleeing to the 
United States, he sent sizable portions of his rather modest salary to his mother, Rosa, on a 
monthly basis. Eventually, following Kristallnacht, he arranged for her to move to England, and 
finally in 1941 to the United States, which was quite difficult given the circumstances and it 
ultimately cost Fromm thousands of dollars throughout the process.190 Fromm extended these 
same efforts to other family members as well, including his cousin Heinz Brandt, who was 
arrested in 1934 for his role in the Communist Party and anti-Nazi underground (not to mention 
his Jewishness), and his aunt Gertrud Brandt. He also corresponded with the Krause family, 
which included his Aunt Sophie, his uncle David, his cousin Charlotte, his other aunt and uncle 
Martha and Bernhard, and his mentors Salman Rabinkow and Peter Glück, only to name a 
handful of the many Jews whom Fromm assisted throughout the horrors of the holocaust.191 
Fromm’s assistance varied in both effort and success. For instance, while he sent plenty 
of money to the Brandts, and exhausted nearly every possible method to secure Heinz’s release 
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and emigration, he played a more limited role in the Krause’s family plight, despite Sophie’s 
many letters and pleas.192 Heinz Brandt survived the holocaust, despite being forced to walk the 
“Death March” from the concentration camp Auschwitz to Buchenwald. Though Fromm never 
secured his freedom, Brandt later remarked that he survived due to “luck” facilitated by 
Fromm.193 His Aunt Sophie and Uncle David were not so lucky, though many other family 
members and friends eventually found themselves in Palestine, Brazil, the United States and 
Cuba, among other places. Despite all of these personal difficulties, in Escape From Freedom 
Fromm remains a proponent of nonviolent action throughout. He argued, “...freedom is not less 
endangered if attacked in the name of anti-fascism or in that of outright fascism.”194 For Fromm, 
one must defend freedom above all else, violent action in the name of anti-fascism is not 
justifiable, and the restriction of another’s freedom for the same reason is equally illegitimate. 
This view will inform much of Fromm’s political action in the fifties and sixties, as I will discuss 
in more depth. 
Fromm was also removed from the Frankfurt School in 1938. This expulsion occurred, at 
least in part, due to some of the same intellectual differences outlined in this paper. As Fromm’s 
biographer points out, Theodor Adorno grew increasingly hostile to much of Fromm’s thought, 
contrary to Fromm, “Adorno was postulating a ‘negative dialectic’ in which the freedom of the 
individual resided in instinctual resistance ‘outside’ the existing social and political order.”195 
While Marcuse was the first to theorize on negative dialectics, Adorno, before Marcuse, saw 
how incompatible Fromm’s ideas were with negative dialectics. Still, Fromm found a new cohort 
of intellectuals, comprised of the neo-Freudians Harry Stack Sullivan, Clara Thompson, Karen 
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Horney, and Margaret Mead, who offered more optimistic theories— and as a result, would later 
fall under Marcuse’s explicit ire in the Dissent debate. These intellectuals offered Fromm a 
sexually progressive community, as both heterosexual and same-sex affairs were common 
between members, though with the likely exception of Fromm himself.196 
As much as Escape From Freedom was written following “a decade of dialogue with 
tough-minded Frankfurt Institute colleagues,” it was also written in this context: his friends and 
family living in Nazi Germany pleading for his assistance, his expulsion from the Frankfurt 
School, and his newfound vibrant community of intellectuals, Mead, Horney, and Sullivan.197 
Indeed, as Fromm was working on Escape From Freedom, he was also working almost daily to 
secure emigration for one person or another, and he corresponded with many different distressed 
people just as frequently.198 This lent an undeniably personal element to Escape From Freedom; 
for Fromm fascism was not simply an obscure political ideology but a very real threat to himself 
and his loved ones. Before it was complete, Fromm explained it to a friend, saying “the theme 
which is nearest to my heart and which is the leitmotif of the book is the problem of freedom and 
anxiety or the fear of freedom or the escape from freedom.”199 His relationship with Heinz 
Brandt, for example, helped Fromm develop theories of positive freedom, and according to him 
were important in nearly all of his ideas on authoritarianism.200 The simultaneous urgency and 
optimism of Escape From Freedom can also be explained in part by the upbeat letters he 
received from his aunt Sophie, who before being murdered by the Nazis wrote a series of letters 
that read positive sentiments such as, “We have had a good life and beautiful life because we 
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have good children and grandchildren that we can be proud of” and “how nice it was that we 
were so lucky to know so many good people and dear people in our life.”201 If Sophie Krause 
could remain optimistic while facing her untimely death because of fascism, surely one could 
remain optimistic under Western capitalism. Similarly, the freedom and spontaneity which he 
saw practiced by Sullivan, Horney, and the other neo-Freudians became the embodiment of 
Fromm’s notion of productive freedom from authority, defined by unconventional love and free 
sexual expression.202  
 
Erich Fromm and Democratic Socialism 
Throughout the fifties and sixties Erich Fromm was increasingly attracted to political 
action in his own right, though this action was geared toward his vision of “humanistic 
socialism” which he espoused most clearly in The Sane Society. Intellectually, Fromm was 
concerned with “organizational forms and procedures that would enable a society’s transition 
into democratic socialism.”203 His actions indicate that he genuinely believed in these 
“reformist” acts (positive acts, to Marcuse) and their potential to increase positive freedom. 
Importantly, Fromm worked toward this goal within both the Soviet Bloc as well as the United 
States. In the former, Fromm collaborated with Marxist dissidents to articulate what he called a 
“third force” which was intended to offer alternatives to the alienation prevalent in the Soviet 
Union, without embracing western capitalist exploitation.204 205 In the latter, Fromm donated to 
and was active in political parties and organizations, such as the American Socialist Party and 
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Amnesty International, as well as individual political campaigns, including those of Adlai 
Stevenson and Eugene McCarthy’s presidential campaigns, he funded and co-founded SANE 
(National Committee for A Sane Nuclear Policy), he testified multiple times before the Senate 
Foreign Relations Committee, and he fostered relationships with a number of American 
politicians.206 
After the Dissent debate, Fromm only became increasingly involved in American 
politics. Indeed, though Fromm “lost” the debate with Marcuse, he went on to sell millions of his 
books, and for perhaps the first time in his life Fromm had plenty of money.207 His political 
action, more often than not, led him to donate to various causes and campaigns, and this in turn 
led him to develop relationships with American politicians. For the sake of brevity, I will not 
detail all of his relationships, but the most notable- and odd- is that of his friendship with 
Arkansas Senator J. William Fulbright. The two influenced each other in a variety of ways— 
Fromm even assisted with developing campaign themes for Fulbright, suggesting that he could 
appeal to Arkansas voters with “concepts of individualism” and “the importance of values to live 
what one professes as against being subject to the manipulation of the big machine.”208 
According to Lawrence Friedman, Fromm made substantial contributions to Fulbright’s 
campaign, and Fulbright even read the Dissent debate, remarking that if it had taken place in the 
senate, Fromm would have won.209 
Fromm’s relationship with Fulbright is useful for understanding Fromm’s larger role in 
American politics and the apparent sacrifices he had to make in order to lessen the adverse 
effects of capitalism. Indeed, Fulbright was a staunch segregationist (a point which Friedman 
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fails to mention) who signed the “Southern Manifesto,” though Fromm continued to support him 
enthusiastically, mostly because of his “progressive” foreign policy.210 A generous interpretation 
of Fromm’s kinship with Fulbright is that Fromm understood the confines of the society he was 
operating under; it is better to have a more progressive senator from Arkansas who is against 
McCarthyism, and later the war in Vietnam, even if that man is a segregationist, than a 
potentially more conservative, militaristic politician. Of course, not all of Fromm’s political 
support went to segregationists, but it is difficult to imagine Herbert Marcuse making the same 
concessions. Fulbright, Adlai Stevenson, and Eugene McCarthy were hardly anti-capitalists, let 
alone “humanist socialists.” And yet, Fromm’s vision of dialectics allows for such compromises: 
if revolution is not immediate, it is worthwhile to emphasize and strengthen positive freedoms, 
which entails supporting those who have the power to do so (though one would think such 
freedoms would necessarily be extended to all people, regardless of race).  
In some ways, Fromm was also admired by a number of student activists in the 1960s, 
though he was far less interested in the student movement than Marcuse, and devoted most of his 
time to institutional politics.211 By the end of the sixties, though Fromm became increasingly 
involved in the peace movement, he was unable to develop the same relationship with students 
that Marcuse had, in no small part due to the fact that Marcuse better accounted for race and 
colonialism in his writing.212 His steadfast support for Eugene McCarthy, who after losing his 
bid for president distanced himself from the peace movement, may also have played a significant 
role.213 Indeed, his initial support for McCarthy, not unlike Marcuse’s support for student 
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activism, displayed itself in Fromm’s work; in 1968 he turned a memo he had written for 
McCarthy’s campaign into a book titled The Revolution of Hope, which would go on to heavily 
influence McCarthy’s platform.214 Given that, along with the students uneasiness toward 
“politics as usual” it is easy to see why students generally gravitated toward Marcuse, and, in 
turn, why Fromm never quite embraced the New Left. 
There is, however, another aspect to Fromm’s thought that greatly influenced his political 
action. As I mentioned earlier, Fromm believed in nonviolence and what he called “radical” 
reform. In The Sane Society, he stated, “So-called ‘radicalism’… believes that we can solve 
problems by force, when observation, patience and continuous activity is required.”215 Fromm 
postulated that patience and nonviolent action is far more productive than violence, which can 
either be ineffective, or lead to disastrous consequences, such as the Bolshevik revolution 
resulting in the violent and authoritarian USSR. Above all else, for Fromm, freedom ought to be 
protected and it cannot be denied in the name of any political position, whether that position is 
fascist, anti-fascist, or even socialist.216 His faith in nonviolence and the ideal of freedom 
explains his work within the peace movement, but it also illustrates the fact that his institutional 
political work found its groundings in his own theories. Moreover, his work, like his theories, 
become quite incompatible with Marcuse’s, though Marcuse is often left reconciling his own 
political action within his intellectual work. 
 
Marcuse’s Contradictions 
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Marcuse, not unlike the concepts he often sought to apply the dialectical method to, also 
demonstrated his own internal contradictions. For instance, he predicated his theory on notions 
of “refusal” and yet, after publishing Reason and Revolution, Herbert Marcuse went to work for 
the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), the precursor to what would later become the CIA. Hired 
as a political analyst, Marcuse worked to provide “insight into the enemy’s political culture” 
alongside other Frankfurt School members, Franz Neumann and Otto Kirchheimer.217 Marcuse 
was responsible for examining the political developments of countries involved in the war, 
specifically in central western Europe. After the war ended his research unit in the OSS was 
transferred to the State Department, where he was instructed to, in his own words, “identify 
groups in Germany with which one could work towards reconstruction after the war; and to 
identify groups which were to be taken to task as Nazis.”218 Marcuse, along with Neumann and 
Kirchheimer, were to determine which Germans could be trusted, and which should be tried for 
war crimes. They also attempted to counter the trend towards anti-Communism, which was 
becoming increasingly problematic. Henry Pachter wrote, “Franz Neumann and Herbert Marcuse 
bombarded Secretary of War Stimson with plans for a post-war Germany that would give 
democratic socialism a chance; they probably prevented the worst stupidities an occupation 
regime is capable of.”219 In his work for the American government, Marcuse rationalized it 
through his own theoretical values, albeit in a less “nihilistic” manner than his intellectual work. 
Moreover, Marcuse’s efforts in favor of democratic socialism abroad in the forties is not 
dissimilar to Fromm’s own work in both the West and the Eastern bloc in the fifties and sixties. 
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Perhaps unsurprisingly, according to Marcuse, he was criticized by leftists for what they 
saw as his role as a “CIA agent” and de facto “agent of imperialism.”220 In all fairness, the CIA 
is hardly the embodiment of the ideals of Critical Theory, let alone of communism. Yet Marcuse 
argued in response, “If critics reproach me for that, it only shows the complete ignorance of these 
people, who seem to have forgotten that the war then was a war against fascism and that, 
consequently, I haven’t the slightest reason for being ashamed of having assisted in it.”221 Most 
scholars of Marcuse recognize that his role within the OSS was an important one, and that his 
contributions were both tangible and aligned with his anti-fascist theories. In fact, true to his 
nature, Marcuse was perhaps the most skeptical of his government employment. In an interview 
with Jurgen Habermas only a year before his death, he was asked whether he made any 
significant difference; “On the contrary” he replied, “Those whom we had listed first as 
‘economic war criminals’ were very quickly back in the decisive positions of responsibility in 
the German economy.”222 Marcuse may have recognized the importance of fighting fascism, but 
he had no illusions about the bureaucratic organization he worked for. His reflections on his 
work within the OSS demonstrate a palpable tension, for he acknowledges the shortcomings of 
the American government, though justifies his work through the primary goal of fighting 
fascism. Even for Marcuse compromises could be made when faced with dire circumstances. 
Still, alongside Marcuse’s work for the American government, many of Marcuse’s critics 
have argued that another apparent contradiction between Marcuse’s thought and action is his 
embrace of bourgeois culture and lifestyles. After all, he did grow up in a wealthy, upper-middle 
class household, to a Jewish family well integrated into German society. As Stuart Jeffries puts 
                                               
220 Kellner, 149 
221 Herbert Marcuse and Karl Popper, Revolution or Reform? A Confrontation (Chicago: Precedent Publishing, 
1985), 56 
222 Kellner, 149 
Mantell 64 
it, he was dependent on his father's commerce “but queasy about becoming contaminated by its 
spirit.”223 Marcuse certainly developed, in the words of Martin Jay, a “taste for the finer things in 
life.”224 Even when Marcuse was arguing with Adorno about the importance of the student 
movement, he made sure to invite the beleaguered and sick man to join him on vacation, 
insisting that “daily swimming in the Mediterranean and French cuisine aid mental and bodily 
recuperation.”225 His step-son, Osha Neumann (who was the son of Marcuse’s late colleague 
Franz Neumann and Inge Neumann, his second wife) recalled that his childhood was “very 
repressive. Herbert, in terms of his personal life, insisted on a level of distance and a level of 
bourgeois order in his life that was very protective of him. I remember him telling me very 
approvingly of Thomas Mann, who at least according to Herbert, would get up every morning 
and put on a jacket and tie and then sit down at his desk and then write books about people led 
by passion.”226 For all of his polemics against bourgeois society Marcuse undoubtedly enjoyed at 
least some of what it had to offer. 
Along with his bourgeois proclivities, Marcuse, for all of his radical political theories, 
had a well-documented affinity for “higher” European culture, which he believed could provide 
an opposition to the existing order, for “contains the rationality of negation,” even if that order 
could accommodate and whither its criticism.227 Accordingly, he also demonstrated a disdain for 
low-brow culture; Marcuse, for instance, regarded jazz as Adorno did, “as part of the culture 
industry that kept the status quo in place.”228 Marcuse’s bourgeois inclinations undoubtedly 
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infiltrated his thought— even the term, “The Great Refusal” originated from the surrealist André 
Breton. In his work, Marcuse sought a group that could replace the proletariat as a revolutionary 
catalyst, allegedly because of his own experience with the actual proletariat’s failures in Weimar 
Germany. But for him that was often articulated most likely as an intellectual elite, privileged 
students, or, at best, people of color and other disenfranchised people.229 He never permitted the 
possibility for the traditional Marxist proletarian revolution, and at the same time, he 
unabashedly enjoyed exclusive bourgeois luxuries, luxuries which the proletariat could not 
enjoy. In the sixties, though, Marcuse attempts to resolve his own internal contradictions, in 
several different ways. 
 
The Intersection of Dialectics and Political Action 
In many respects, Marcuse’s work in the sixties denotes a significant departure from his 
theories, much to Adorno’s displeasure. As I mentioned earlier, Marcuse was the only member 
of the Frankfurt School who embraced the student movement and believed that if any 
revolutionary change was possible perhaps it was to be achieved by the student protestors in the 
sixties. his colleague Theodor Adorno called the police on protestors who had occupied a room 
in the Institute for Social Research in Frankfurt, Marcuse wrote to him disappointingly, “I still 
believe that our cause (which is not only ours) is better taken up by the rebellious students than 
by the police, and, here in California, that is demonstrated to me almost daily (and not only in 
California).”230 Indeed, while Adorno and Habermas accused the students of “left-fascism,” and 
Adorno argued the student movement could never bring about a “social intervention” Marcuse 
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demurred, and hopefully remarked, “I certainly do believe that the student movement does have 
the prospect of ‘effecting a social intervention.’”231 
Marcuse’s hearty embrace of the protest movements in the 1960s is especially notable 
given his relative pessimism which I detailed in the previous chapter. To be sure, Adorno 
thought as much and angrily wrote to him:  
You object to Jürgen [Habermas]’s expression ‘left fascism’, calling it a contradictio in adjecto. 
But you are a dialectician, aren’t you? As if such contradictions did not exist—might not a 
movement, by the force of its immanent antinomies, transform itself into its opposite?232  
 
To Adorno and other critics, Marcuse was abandoning his dialectical position in favor of praxis, 
embodied by the students. But Marcuse argued that, on the contrary, his faith in the students was 
rooted in his understanding of dialectical and historical progress. Throughout the sixties he 
increasingly entertained the idea that the prevailing order had possibly reached its “determinate 
negation” and the students’ actions were sufficiently negative to precipitate its total 
destruction.233 While he sometimes entertained notions of an intellectual dictatorship, Marcuse 
expressed hope in One-Dimensional Man that the social order would be upended by:  
The substratum of outcasts and outsiders, the exploited and persecuted of other races and other 
colours, the unemployed and the unemployable. They exist outside the democratic process; their 
life is the most immediate and the most real need for ending intolerable conditions and 
institutions.234 
 
Many students fit this description, including his own, and as such were uniquely positioned to 
“negate” repressive society. Moreover, their tactics were “extra-parliamentary,”235 their 
opposition “hits the system from without” and “violates the rules of the game, and in doing so, 
reveals it as a rigged game.”236 While far from perfect, in many ways student protests were 
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sufficiently negative for Marcuse. If Fromm’s theories in the fifties were “reformist” or 
“positive” to Marcuse, the students offered a negative optimism, one that could sufficiently 
disrupt the status quo. 
Marcuse’s theoretical evolution was also noted by activists such as Angela Davis. Davis, 
the famous African-American activist and Marcuse’s student, for instance notes his views on 
culture changed, and claimed that Marcuse began to “recognize we shouldn’t be concerned with 
high versus low culture. We should be concerned with the work that culture does.”237 She argued 
the change that occurred within Marcuse’s thought came about, at least in part, as a result of his 
experience working with student activists. According to Davis, “... Marcuse’s thought revealed 
how deeply he himself was influenced by the movements of his time and how his engagement 
with those movements revitalised his thought.”238 His faith in this movement increasingly 
influenced his work throughout the 1960s, adding a new optimistic character to his dialectical 
thought. To be sure, Marcuse had considerable influence on student activists, who treated him as 
a celebrity and, in France in 1968 held up a banner that read “Marx, Mao, Marcuse,” in 
admiration of this “revolutionary trinity.”239 After all, Marcuse’s notion of The Great Refusal, 
which he first articulated in the mid-1950s, seemed to embody the efforts of the New Left which 
had sought to replace the traditional leftist emphasis on working class politics in favor of a total 
revolt against all of society, against its racism, its imperialism, its militarism and its technocratic 
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oppression.240 241 From the hippies to the student protestors, The Great Refusal appeared to be 
put into practice on a grand-scale in the 1960s. 
The New Left and the counter-cultural movement was clearly influenced by Marcuse, but 
Marcuse was also influenced by them. For instance, he felt comfortable offering a glimmer of 
hope in One-Dimensional Man, a hope he hardly allowed to permeate his work and criticism of 
Fromm in the fifties, in part because of student activism. He then went onto tackle specific 
political ventures, including the war in Vietnam, American intervention in Latin America, and 
the oppression of Black people in the American south.242 He began producing politically pointed 
works, a notable departure from his philosophical work which rarely mentioned specific political 
aspirations. For example, his 1965 essay “Repressive Tolerance,” argued for, in the words of 
Douglas Kellner, “intolerance toward towards the established society and its racism, militarism 
and imperialism...”243 Marcuse expressed a disdain for institutional politics, “the exercise of 
political rights… in a society of total administration serves to strengthen this administration by 
testifying to the existence of democratic liberties which, in reality, have changed their content 
and lost their effectiveness.”244 One can almost imagine Marcuse directing his words toward 
Fromm for his engagement with senators and governmental institutions.  
Significantly, Marcuse also began writing about race issues, a topic he rarely discussed 
until the sixties. In 1969 he wrote “An Essay on Liberation” in which he argues: 
While it is true that the white man is guilty, it is equally true that white men are rebels and 
radicals. However, the fact is that monopolistic imperialism validates the racist thesis: it subjects 
ever more nonwhite populations to the brutal power of its bombs, poisons, and moneys; thus 
making even the exploited white population in the metropoles partners and beneficiaries of the 
global crime. Class conflicts are being superseded or blotted out by race conflicts: color lines 
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become economic and political realities – a development rooted in the dynamic of late 
imperialism and its struggle for new methods of internal and external colonization.245 
 
Critical theory is often noted for its totalizing condemnation of society; “the whole is the false” 
and all those who live under capitalism suffer under capitalism. Yet, Marcuse’s argument shows 
the potential for critical theory to account for race in its doctrine. White people may suffer under 
capitalism and imperialism, but they are also guilty and benefit from its violence. Meanwhile his 
newfound interest in imperialism finds its roots in the New Left movement. His ideas can be 
situated within the burgeoning number of writers such as Fanon and Sartre, who were 
increasingly critiquing imperialism. Sartre wrote, for instance, in 1964 “mechanization 
engenders technology-driven unemployment: agricultural labourers are replaced by machines. 
This would be of considerable but limited importance if Algeria had any industry. But the 
colonial system denies it any.”246 In One-Dimensional Man, Marcuse’s primary concern was the 
effect of technology on the individual. Yet, by the mid-1960s, other intellectuals have shown that 
colonized people had a very different relationship to technology and capitalism as a whole. The 
fact that Marcuse had shifted his focus from the “technocracy” to include analyses on 
imperialism is emblematic of the fact that he was participating in a much larger conversation, 
inspired and advanced by the New Left. In fact, it is because of colonized peoples exclusion from 
technocratic oppression that Marcuse argues they are uniquely situated to “negate” advanced 
industrial society. Moreover, though Marcuse had largely abandoned Marx’s class analysis 
decades prior to writing “An Essay on Liberation,” his acknowledgement that other divisions, 
particularly racial divisions, had taken its place represents a striking theoretical refinement. The 
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proletariat was not replaced solely by the “intelligentsia” as Marcuse long theorized, but by 
oppressed people of color and colonized people abroad.247 
However, in perhaps his most notable intellectual departure, Marcuse advocated for 
political violence. He observed in “Repressive Tolerance” that violence was perpetuated 
regularly “by the police, in the prisons and mental institutions, in the fight against racial 
minorities” and abroad in the imperial wars waged in the name of democracy.248 In the face of 
this violence, Marcuse argues, there is no alternative but to engage in anti-colonial, anti-
capitalist, and anti-fascist violence: 
In terms of historical function, there is a difference between revolutionary and reactionary 
violence, between violence practiced by the oppressed and by the oppressors. In terms of ethics, 
both forms of violence are inhuman and evil— but since when is history made according to 
ethical standards? To start applying them at the point where the oppressed rebel against the 
oppressors, the have-nots against the haves is serving the cause of actual violence by weakening 
the protest against it.249 
 
Marcuse’s piece was thus quite politically charged, much to the delight of radical students and to 
the ire of the academic establishment and ordinary Americans- in fact he was accused of 
“corrupting the youth” by other intellectuals and received several death threats throughout the 
sixties.250 And yet, Marcuse was no stranger to wielding political violence; in Berlin in 1918 
Marcuse had joined a communist civilian defense force, and was assigned to shoot at right-wing 
snipers.251 It is remarkable that Marcuse’s peers were so appalled at his justification of political 
violence given the fact he had actively engaged in such violence decades ago. However, the fact 
that Marcuse was, in the sixties, developing a more elaborate political theory in which violence 
was justified due to the asymmetry of power between the oppressed and the oppressors remains 
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indicative of his larger theoretical evolution. Crucially, as he increasingly modified his theories 
he never abandoned the principles which he had based his prior theories, and presumably, actions 
upon. Dialectics, for instance, continued to feature heavily in his work, even as he confronted 
new political and historical questions. 
Marcuse’s work throughout the sixties demonstrate that he was particularly keen on 
applying dialectical logic to prevalent political situations. For instance, Marcuse justified his 
opposition to exercising political rights by arguing that “within a repressive society, even 
progressive movements threaten to turn into their opposite to the degree to which they accept the 
rules of the game.”252 Here Marcuse reiterated a common dialectical concept of his. In simple 
terms, if a progressive movement acts within the legal and institutional confines of society it may 
be rendered no longer progressive (it will be negated) by the more comprehensive “negation,” 
which is all of repressive society. Not only are reform movements ineffectual, they can actually 
become repressive themselves. Conversely, affecting political change from outside of the 
political system has its own dialectical logic: 
Dialectics of democracy: if democracy means self-government of free people, with justice for all, 
then the realization of democracy would presuppose abolition of the existing pseudo-
democracy… the fight for democracy thus tends to assume anti-democratic forms, and to the 
extent to which the democratic decisions are made in “parliaments” on all levels, the opposition 
will tend to become extra-parliamentary. The movement to extend constitutionally professed 
rights and liberties to the daily life of the oppressed minorities, even the movement to preserve 
existing rights and liberties, will become “subversive” to the degree to which it will meet the 
stiffening resistance of the majority against an “exaggerated” interpretation and application of 
equality and justice.253 
 
On the one hand, Marcuse’s argument is that in order to establish an authentic democracy a 
complete negation (abolition) of the current structure is required. On the other hand, as the 
contradictions within the current democratic system become exacerbated through supposedly 
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“anti-democratic” efforts, which in reality are working toward democratic goals such as equality 
and freedom, the current system will become even less democratic, as it is faced with its own 
internal contradictions. As this procedure unfolds, more democratic movements will become 
“subversive” insofar as they are rendered increasingly, and more obviously, incompatible with 
the prevailing “democratic” system. While Adorno implied that there is essentially no way to 
“act” dialectically, Marcuse argued on the contrary that dialectical logic necessitates extra-
democratic action, and to act within democratic institutions is to ignore the dialectical reality, 
which consequently, promotes the repression of the prevailing society. This logic also serves to 
reason Marcuse’s defense of violent action aside from his own experience with it; violent 
revolutionary action is quite extra-democratic. As Angela Davis so aptly remarked about 
Marcuse, “He emphasized the important role of intellectuals within oppositional movements, 
which, I believe, led more intellectuals to frame their work in relation to these than would 
otherwise have done so.”254 Marcuse, then, was framing his work in relations to the movement 
and proliferation of ideas that Critical Theory had previously left unaccounted for. 
Although the Frankfurt School rarely involved themselves with direct political action, 
extra-democratically or otherwise, both Marcuse and Fromm were certainly exceptions to this 
rule, with Marcuse’s activism and Fromm’s role in the left-wing of the democratic party. Both 
men even retained an optimism, exhibited by their unique political activities in the sixties, that 
confirmed their roles as outliers within the field of critical theory. Yet, while in both cases this 
was rooted in a dialectical understanding of history, Marcuse and Fromm’s analyses and political 
activities differed substantially. Marcuse sought out those who were excluded from the social 
order and would thus be positioned in such a way to sufficiently negate it. His involvement with 
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the New Left led him to increasingly account for colonialism and racism, and he believed that 
participation within the system is tantamount to its endorsement. He argued that violence can 
serve righteous political purposes and was certainly far better than accepting institutionalized 
violence. Fromm, on the other hand, sought out ways to emphasize positive freedoms. Often 
Fromm worked within the system of institutional politics, and he demonstrated a willingness to 
make compromises in order to ensure his message would be received by the people who had 
power to respond. He adhered to his nonviolent doctrine throughout. Their actions, in many 
ways, serve to exhibit the culmination of the distinction between their notions of dialecticism.  
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Epilogue: Love and Refusal in the 21st Century 
In the last few years there has been a notable surge of writing on Critical Theory and the 
Frankfurt School. Stuart Jeffries’ work, Grand Hotel Abyss, which I cite several times 
throughout this thesis, was only published in 2016. In 2013, Lawrence J. Friedman wrote his 
biography on Erich Fromm. In 2014, Stephen Whitfield wrote an article for Dissent (of all 
places) analyzing Marcuse’s legacy in the twenty-first century.255 Following the election of 
Donald Trump to the American presidency, The New Yorker published a piece titled “The 
Frankfurt School Knew Trump Was Coming.”256 And of course, conservatives and progressives 
alike have traced the notion of “cultural Marxism” to thinkers such as Adorno and Marcuse, 
either to lament or celebrate them and their influence on young activists today. Despite all of 
this, understanding Critical Theory, decades after its inception, is no easy feat. Understanding 
Fromm and Marcuse’s contribution to Critical Theory, however, may help us. 
In 2005 Angela Davis wrote that “the overarching themes of Marcuse’s thought are as 
relevant today on the cusp of the twenty-first century as they were when his scholarship and 
political interventions were most celebrated.”257 She then went on to posit important questions 
about how one can begin to understand Marcuse’s relevance today: “How do we draw upon 
Marcuse’s critical theory in our attempt to develop new vocabularies of resistance today, 
vocabularies that effect a rupture with the equation of equation of affirmative action and ‘reverse 
racism,’ vocabularies that reflect a utopian vision of a society without prisons, at least without 
the monstrous, corporatized system that we call the prison industrial complex?”258 We can 
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similarly ask questions of Fromm; how do we draw upon his theories to understand our own 
responsibilities within capitalist society? How do activists incorporate his steadfast adherence to 
nonviolent action into their own work? Can political reform also be radical? In a larger sense, 
Fromm and Marcuse offer us a different set of options and ways to engage with politics. Indeed, 
their condemnation of the liberal bourgeois order seems as if it is lent a newer relevance in the 
twenty-first century, as news articles and scholarly works are published almost daily claiming 
that liberalism is in crisis. Given the resurgence of far-right politics, Fromm’s work on the appeal 
of authoritarianism to individuals and Marcuse’s argument that fascist tendencies exist, indeed 
thrive, within “enlightened” capitalist society seem as if they could have been written today. 
However, attempting to apply theories written decades ago is always a problematic 
endeavor. Even as Davis argues for Marcuse’s relevance she warns, “He, more than anyone, 
insisted on the deeply historical character of theory,” adding: 
It would certainly militate the spirit of his ideas to argue that his work contains the solution to the 
many dilemmas facing us as scholars, organizers, advocates, artists, and, I would add, as 
marginalized communities, whose members are increasingly treated as detritus and relegated to 
prisons, which, in turn, generate astronomical profits for a growing global prison industry.259 
 
Again, this warning can be equally applied to Fromm, who rarely accounted for race, gender, and 
sexuality in his writings. He spoke of radical, anti-capitalist love, but he did not demonstrate the 
many different forms such love can take. As for Marcuse, his almost dogmatic disdain for 
institutional politics itself seems outdated, as more women, people of color, queer people and 
even socialists are seeking political office, many victoriously. Whether or not the procurement of 
power for those who have been historically stripped of it will lend itself to a radical alteration of 
society, of course, remains to be seen. Marcuse, I am sure, would be wary. 
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There is also a deep historical misjudgment in the works of Fromm and Marcuse. 
Marcuse sanguinely believed that the countercultural movement signified the dialectical negation 
of the social order. If one is to take his dialectical position seriously, this must be recognized as a 
miscalculation of the historical forces, for society did not reach its determinate negation. 
Capitalism reigns, perhaps more forcefully than ever before. Some even blame Marcuse for the 
countercultural movement’s failure, as Cohn-Bendit, a leader of the 1968 French revolt 
remarked, “We read too much Marcuse when instead we should have been reading Arendt.”260 
Perhaps, in light of my thesis, one could just as easily argue that they should have been reading 
Fromm. And yet, Fromm’s own historical calculation is not any more accurate than Marcuse’s. 
Fromm argued that despite certain setbacks, society is always progressing, and always procuring 
more freedoms for more people. In the fifties, notions of benevolent capitalism rang true, as 
many more people had access to middle class lifestyles, social security, and time for leisure. As 
McLaughlin rightly pointed out, Fromm was wrong in believing that this affluence would be the 
new normal for modern industrial societies. His general faith in democracy, and the eventual 
realization of socialist humanism, while understandable given the historical context, was 
ultimately misplaced. 
Despite the obvious shortcomings of their works, I believe that Fromm and Marcuse still 
offer pertinent theories. Even as Adorno’s total indictment of western civilization has come to 
define Critical Theory, Fromm and Marcuse offer us a more optimistic interpretation. They even 
demonstrate how one can participate in capitalist society (or from the outside) while still 
articulating the deficiencies of that same society. They explore ways in which oppositional 
politics can manifest, an endeavor that Adorno and Horkheimer, for instance, never embark 
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upon. As Fromm and Marcuse show us, one does not have to accept the conditions imposed upon 
them, and intellectuals and academics can apply their theories to political activism. In that way 
Marcuse and Fromm predicted, arguably more than any other critical theorist, the modern 
relationship between academic and political work. 
The purpose of writing this thesis was never to indicate the superior thought of one 
theorist over the other, and it certainly was not to show that Marcuse was right all along in his 
indictment of Fromm. Rather, it was to emphasize the historical intellectual differences between 
these two thinkers and offer a new aspect to Critical Theory that has been underemphasized. One 
can accept the ideas and condemnations of society offered by Critical Theory while still 
partaking in political acts. It does not have to be, as regarded by many, a theory for the hopeless 
and disillusioned. Recent attempts, such as McLaughlin’s, to accentuate the similarities between 
these two very different critical theorists is not helpful to modern readers of Critical Theory, 
even as it importantly shifted the academic conversation away from the psychoanalytic argument 
of the Fromm-Marcuse debate. We can acknowledge the vast intellectual differences between 
Fromm and Marcuse while still admitting that both remain relevant, even decades after their 
writing. In fact, the equation of Marcuse’s thought to Fromm’s, aside from its inaccuracy, is also 
consequential. The centuries-long debate between reform and revolution, for instance, 
platitudinous as it may be, brings with it serious ramifications, and it is just as applicable today 
as it was one hundred years ago. Should one find meaning within capitalist society, through love 
and work, or dedicate their life to disrupting the status quo? Should one make compromises in 
the hopes of affecting some change, or adhere steadfastly to their values, acknowledging that no 
change may come of it? Is society utterly irredeemable? These are some of the questions 
Marcuse and Fromm address in their works, and, as I demonstrated, they answered them quite 
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differently. To treat these vastly different ideas as if they are inconsequential is a disservice to 
Fromm and Marcuse as much as it is to modern readers of Critical Theory. 
The title of this thesis, “Love and Refusal” is quite plainly a summation of Fromm and 
Marcuse’s different answers to the problems posed by modern society. “Love is the only sane 
and satisfactory answer to the problem of human existence” Fromm wrote in 1956. For Marcuse, 
writing in 1964, if such an answer exists it is only through the actions of “those who, without 
hope, have given and give their life to the Great Refusal.”261 In their own way, these two ideas 
offer hope to the reader who subscribes to their critique of modern society. Marcuse and Fromm 
reassure us. Under capitalism you may be inconsequential, but it does not have to be so. Perhaps 
above all else, Marcuse and Fromm’s idealistic imagination of what society can look like 
reminds those disheartened by capitalism, racism, imperialism, and even fascism today, that 
there are alternatives. How can these alternatives be realized? Fromm and Marcuse gave us a few 
different approaches.  
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